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Recent literary theory has assumed that literary works are reflections of the dominant 
ideological thought present within culture.  This thesis addresses the question of what role the 
aesthetic nature of a literary work plays in determining its own ideological meaning.  Terry 
Eagleton claims that literature and literary theory have reinforced the dominant political modes 
of thought, as the aesthetic properties have merely masked this ideological function, and must be 
disregarded in order to reveal the true ideological nature contained within a work.  Deriving his 
framework from Jaques Lacan, Slavoj Zizek argues that ideology is pervasive through all levels 
of culture, inseparable from fundamental understanding. He further reveals a divide between the 
Symbolic order which contains conceptualized understanding in language, and the Real which 
escapes such definition.  Umberto Eco argues that interpretation must remain coherent with the 
totality of the work in order to avoid overinterpretation, which uses the work as an example of 
something external to itself. Alan Sinfield argues that literature reveals “faultlines” within a 
culture, and allows dissident views to engage with dominant ideologies.  Mikhail Bakhtin’s view 
of dialogism suggests that any literary expression will contain multiple views or ideologies, 
including internally persuasive ones which can be contained within aesthetic expression, and 
external authoritative ones which remain detached from artistic nature. 
 This thesis argues that defining a work of literature as a particular example of an 
ideological position disregards the aesthetic qualities it possesses and reduces it to an 
indistinguishable cultural artifact which is used as an example of culture without recognizing the 
unique experience that it provides as a narrative. Such attempts diminish the continuing 
possibilities of meaning that a work can generate through its ambiguous nature. Rather, the 
aesthetic qualities of literature allow it to provide multiple meanings which surpass reduction to a 
specific ideological position, even as it necessarily possesses ideological content.   Final 
ideological conclusions are deferred, and interpretative freedom is provided for the reader to 
reach individual conclusions in the aesthetic space beyond Symbolic conceptualized thought 
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Chapter 1: Ideology and Literary Theory 
 
Trends in literary theory over the last several decades have revealed the significant links 
between literary works and the culture that produces them. The ideological viewpoints of 
society, particularly, have become significantly transmitted through literature.  Political 
criticisms, primarily those related to Marxist theory, such as the analysis presented by Terry 
Eagleton and Slavoj Zizek, have revealed the extensive magnitude of ideological influence on 
cultural products and suggest that there is never a neutral point of view from which ideology can 
be objectively and comparatively evaluated. The field of theory has taken a wide approach to 
examining the content of literature, noting the contextual relations that surround and inform it.  
This process has, however, potentially displaced the importance of the work as an artistic 
product, leaving it to be just a cultural and political document.  Although some political critics 
suggest that the dominant ideology is always transmitted and reinforced, a recognition of what 
differentiates literature from other kinds of discourse reveals a gap from which alternate and 
multiple ideological views can emerge.   
Although literature necessarily contains ideological thought, a final interpretation cannot 
be completely fixed to a single political view.  As an artwork, the literary work continually 
invites reinterpretation of its multiple possibilities of meaning.  Literature provides an excellent 
example of the intellectual trends of a particular place and time, but that does not necessitate that 
literature must sustain the thinking of the era.   As a form of art, it has the ability to bring 
something new into a society and to create new patterns of thought.  Using literature as a 
document of historical importance is illuminating, but that method must be realized as one of 




because theory, while originating new fields of knowledge and interesting discussion, has the 
potential in its wide range of interest to omit or diminish the status of literature as a primarily 
aesthetic artifact.  As a deliberate construction, created through a complex authorial process, 
literature transcends simple social and historical discourse and should be recognized as such.  
Through multiple levels of meaning literature contains an internal tension between its aesthetic 
properties and its ideological content, and can introduce possibilities that undermines the current 
ideology.  Literary interpretation, as an investigation of the work itself, should recognize these 
possibilities of meaning beyond a fixed determination of the immediate ideological content. 
The development of literary theory has revealed the significant presence and pervasive 
nature of ideology which permeates all levels of culture and any resulting artifacts of that culture, 
such as literature.  This presents a problematic situation in which cultural works reinforce 
existing dominant thought and nothing “new” can ever be introduced.  Literary theory has 
explicitly analyzed this condition and has treated the aesthetic features of literature as a 
mechanism for masking and reinforcing ideology.  Eagleton has argued that there is no purely 
detached, objective, or neutral stance from which a critique of ideology can originate 
(“Ideology” xiv).  It can only be viewed subjectively. Literature is useful because it provides a 
particular perspective from which to view history, and the development of literary theory is 
entangled with the political dynamics of culture.  Because it is concrete and an exploration of 
value, feeling, and experience, literature will engage with the questions and problems of a 
cultural nature.  Ultimately, in his view, literature sustains and reinforces the dominant political 
system. Theory does as well, unless it is unmasking the political projections of power underneath 
the aesthetic surface of literature, and the exposure of these mechanisms should be the point of 




Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault, this view suggests that the content of a literary work, 
being inseparable from ideology, is historically determined, and is always a result of its cultural 
context.   
This position, as maintained by Eagleton, prompts consideration of whether aesthetics is 
a servant of ideology, or whether it can produce something beyond ideological thought.  An 
examination of the relationship between aesthetics and ideology will take into consideration 
Zizek’s understanding of ideology, and his Lacanian framework, in suggesting the possibilities 
of aesthetic form as an escape from the totalizing nature of ideology.  In response to recent 
theory, George Levine and Peter Brooks question literary theory’s lack of attention to aesthetic 
form.  Additionally, Lou F. Caton argues that it is aesthetic form combined with the ideological 
particulars that create literary meaning.   As an example, The Tempest by William Shakespeare 
presents a work that is received as primarily political.  Meredith Skura and Barbara Fuchs have 
resisted this idea, pointing out alternate elements of the play while arguing that the 
“Shakespearian” aspects, or the multiplicities of meaning provided by aesthetic construction, 
provide an example of literature transcending ideological particulars. 
In evaluating the ideological conclusions of a work, the process of interpretation is called 
into question. Umberto Eco argues that not all interpretations are plausible and that literary 
works can indeed be over-interpreted.  Good interpretations, in his view, cannot be 
systematically determined, but there are bad interpretations which clearly violate the work. 
While the possible ranges of interpretation can never be fully determined by the author and there 
may be “harmonics“ which multiply and create additional meanings which perhaps were not 
intended by the author but are produced by the language, there can be a limit set where 




path between the extremes of allowing the work to mean anything and being forced to conclude 
one correct interpretation, Eco considers the "rights" of the work in contrast to the potentially 
unlimited rights of the readers.  Additionally, he questions whether interpretation is discovery of 
hidden meaning or the creation of meaning which originates from the reader. Eco’s assertion that 
the work has priority is useful in investigating the ideological content. Presuming that a work 
primarily sustains the dominant ideology gives too much weight to the cultural factors involved.  
Rather, a closer look at a literary work may reveal the faults inherent in its society and provide a 
counter-example to that dominant view.  Assuming that historical thought, as it has come to be 
understood, must be present in the reading can produce over-interpretation and overshadow the 
dissenting threads of thought present within the work.  Jonathan Culler’s response that any use 
provoked by a literary work is a good thing, and anything that limits use is underinterpretation, 
provides an understanding of what theory does and how it can be improved by reintegrating 
attention to aesthetic qualities. 
Alan Sinfield has provided a discussion of how dissident views might be injected into 
society through literature, thereby bypassing the “entrapment model” that views literature as a 
passive transmitter of ideology.  Mikhail Bakhtin has introduced the idea of “dialogism,” in 
which multiple types of language, along with varied ideological views, are entangled within a 
literary narrative.  Rather than a “monologic” form which disseminates a single message, 
dialogic works contain multiple meanings in competition.  Meaning, he suggests, is never finally 
determined, but as always an ongoing process of relation between the author, work, and reader.   
Finally, looking at 1984 as an example of a particular ideological conclusion reveals a 
deeper exploration of ideology. Steven Blakemore explores the connections between language 




Recognition of literature as an exploration of ideology itself, and the possible alternatives to any 
one system, indicates that it can supersede the ideological conditions of its construction. The 
harmonics produced as an aesthetic effect reveal a glimpse of the Lacanian order of the Real, 
existing outside the Symbolic framework from which ideology is constructed. 
Considering literature through a political critique suggests an ideological problem.  Early 
Marxist criticism regarded ideology as that thought which hides and sustains the fundamental 
economic relations of the base.  Existing at the lowest fundamental levels of the superstructure, 
all cultural artifacts, as products of that superstructure, will reproduce this most basic 
understanding.  A particular ideology, reduced to its most basic term in its master signifier, will 
be viewed as possessing a necessary existence, while it is in fact arbitrary.  It could be the case 
that the way the base functions might be different.  However, because the master signifier is 
presented as non-contingent, it cannot be discarded and therefore anything which assumes a 
different structure is renounced as fantasy.  There is nowhere outside of ideology from which to 
evaluate this condition. Since culture necessarily functions within its own ideology, everyone, as 
subjects brought up and interpellated in any culture, will already be immersed in a particular 
viewpoint. Post-Marxist views present more sophisticated analysis which reveal a more complex 
functioning, rather than a simple one-way ideological mask of the base.  Thus, evaluating 
cultural artifacts in terms of ideology requires an extensive examination of how ideology 
operates. 
Because both historical progress and critical analysis have been a result of human culture, 
it is evidently possible for there to be awareness and evaluation of ideology itself.  Historically, 
there have been large shifts, such as the transition from Feudalistic to Capitalistic economic 




become assimilated within the dominant system, as demonstrated in feminist and racial equality 
movements.  Marxism itself, as a critical system, is a realization of the ideological functioning of 
Capitalism.  Without any possibility of recognizing the edge of ideology, this criticism would 
never occur.  While the difficulties presented by Eagleton and Zizek suggest there is never a 
neutral, objective position outside of all ideology, there can be space which reveals that the 
apparent necessity of the master-signifier is a fantasy itself, and through this exposure the 
stability of all ideology is thrown into question.  
Louis Althusser refined Marx’s original definition of ideology, arguing that it is not 
something which just exists in the superstructure of society.  Although it is a product of society, 
it also penetrates through all levels to the fundamental base through which society originates.  
However, even within this view he notes that there are limits to ideology, or possible methods of 
evading it.  In response to the question of art, Althusser claims: “I do not rank real art among the 
ideologies, although art does have a quite particular and specific relationship with ideology” 
(221). He continues by claiming that art “does not give us knowledge in the strict sense, it 
therefore does not replace knowledge . . . I believe that the peculiarity of art is to 'make us see' . . 
.  'make us perceive', 'make us feel' something which alludes to reality” (Althusser 222).  Art, in 
this view, attains a level of autonomy from ideology.  The best art, “real art,” does not supply 
supposed knowledge in response to the world, as ideology does.  Rather, works of art open a 
perception from which the reader can view a wider world and attempt to comprehend the reality 
that art “alludes” to. This reality is not coincidental with the reality posited through the 
artificiality of ideology.  Art operates on levels beyond specific discourse, and includes 
emotional and visceral interaction with the content. This view brings ideology itself into focus as 




Since art can connect an individual to external reality beyond the common understanding of the 
local particulars, it becomes detached from the world of ideology. 
For Eagleton, the point of literature is to reveal cultural thought which can be used to 
evaluate social change. Concluding his work Literary Theory with the chapter on political 
criticism, Eagleton claims that all previous theories are in fact political, and argues that there is 
“no need to drag politics into literary theory . . . it has already been there from the beginning” 
(169). Literary theory, for Eagleton is:  
less an object of intellectual inquiry in its own right than a particular perspective in which 
to view the history of our times. . . For any body of theory concerned with human 
meaning, value, language, feeling and experience will inevitably engage with broader, 
deeper beliefs about the nature of human individuals and societies, problems of power 
and sexuality, interpretations of past history, versions of the present and hopes for the 
future. (170) 
 
Not only is literature most useful in displaying the particular perspectives of its time, revealing 
notions of truth and power, but, he contends, a literary theory which attempts to ignore political 
content is itself ideological. He argues further that:  
literary theory has a most particular relevance to this political system: it has helped, 
wittingly or not, to sustain and reinforce its assumptions . . . Even in the act of fleeing 
modern ideologies, however, literary theory reveals its often unconscious complicity with 
them, betraying its elitism, sexism or individualism in the very 'aesthetic' or 'unpolitical' 
language it finds natural to use of the literary text. (Eagleton, “Literary” 171) 
 
 The literary nature of a work is just a mask that covers the more important political implications. 
Additionally, he claims, the political content aligns with the dominant modes of ideology, as “the 
great majority of the literary theories . . . have strengthened rather than challenged the 
assumptions of the power-system” (Eagleton, “Literary” 170). While this claim does not suggest 
that all individual works of literature support the power systems, the idea that all theory does, as 




ethnic studies, seems untenable.  Illuminating the political nature involved in all of these fields 
does reveal significant content, but dismissing the dissident possiblities is problematic, as it 
neglects the actual potential for social change; possibilities which increase as literary theory 
highlights underlying dynamics. 
Regarding the literary work, in addition to dismissing the aesthetic uniqueness of 
literature, Eagleton claims that “the objects of criticism . . . are in a certain sense contingent and 
replaceable” (177).  This suggests that literature is merely an example of the cultural practices, 
ignoring the particular character and meaning that each work provides to their receptive culture. 
Instead of upholding the parallels between literature and other cultural texts, as Eagleton does, 
literary theory and interpretation should emphasize why literature is a different kind of artifact, 
categorically distinct from others, rather than separated by degrees of similarity.  Because 
literature is capable of being understood in multiple ways, as other forms of discourse are not, it 
invites interpretation.  For Eagleton, literature as a category is an illusion.  It is the whole field 
which demands study rather than the particular objects, as he admits that it is the “wider context” 
which should be given priority (Eagleton, “Literary” 178). It is only the final effect which is 
significant and Eagleton ultimately suggests a replacement of “the illusion of” literary theory 
with the field of rhetoric, removing the idea of literature as a privileged object, and refuting the 
idea that aesthetics is separate from “social determinants” (179).   
This emphasis concerning the ultimate effect of a literary work is the center of Eagleton’s 
view.  But the effect of what?  Is there a constant core of meaning beneath the resulting 
response? If it is only the reception of a work that matters, as a result of how it functions 
throughout history, then meaning becomes completely external. Leaving meaning to be 




construct of the work.  Alternatively, if there is something substantial in the internal structure 
which is effectively brought into culture, then a process of interpretation is necessarily involved.  
Understanding how well a work produces its intended meaning suggests that the work does 
indeed have a unique and identifiable meaning which can be defined and evaluated.  However, if 
literature can sustain multiple meanings, then the totality of what the work conveys is not 
reducible to one definable account.  Through the ambiguity of symbolism and imagery, there will 
always be excesses of meaning which escape, and the intention of the work is incompletely 
understood.  Holding aesthetic significance in importance, a literary theory can acknowledge the 
political content and context of a work, while recognizing that there are lines of parallel meaning 
under the surface, in the depth provided by aesthetic form.  This second line of meaning, and 
possibly third, and fourth, etc., corresponds with the surface understanding of the entire work, 
but the combination provides new associations and insights which are all compatible with the 
work as a whole. 
Eagleton’s view suggests that literature need not be interpreted for any distinctive 
meaning within it, but rather that it should be used for what it can reveal about things outside of 
itself.  Because he dismisses the importance of aesthetic quality as unique and identifiable apart 
from ideology, he views literature as indistinct from other discourse, and therefore “no more than 
a branch of social ideologies” (Eagleton, “Literary” 178). This analysis proposes that the 
assumption of a work to be ideologically “innocent” is naïve and incomplete.  However, 
assuming that a literary work is only of political importance and always supports the power 
system is incomplete as well.  Rather, literature should be assumed as having emerged from a 
political background.  This component, however, is not necessarily just the reinforcement of 




overall complexity of meaning, the political content will likely be complex as well, resisting a 
singular conclusion.   
Elaborating on his traditional Marxist view in Ideology: An Introduction, Eagleton rejects 
post-structural skepticism and argues that the concept of ideology becomes empty if there is no 
truth which grounds ideas in reality. Existing in the middle, literature connects theoretical 
examination of ideology to lived experience.  Ideology is not a type of discourse, but rather “a 
set of effects within discourse” (Eagleton, “Ideology” 194). Claiming that ideology “expresses a 
will, a hope or a nostalgia, rather than describing a reality,” Eagleton argues that “it is 
fundamentally a matter of fearing and denouncing, reverencing and reviling, all of which then 
sometimes gets coded into a discourse which looks as though it is describing the way things 
actually are" (19). This view understands ideology as performative statements rather than 
descriptive ones.  Connections between the fields of aesthetics and ideology begin to appear in 
his analysis, as both types of content lack an external corresponding “truth” from which they can 
objectively be evaluated as true or false.   Ideological discourse appears to describe the way 
things actually are when they are not in fact that way.  In this way ideology is deceptive.  
Although Eagleton continues to argue for the similarities, at this point there also seems to be a 
divergence between aesthetics and ideology in the matter of intent. Art, in contrast, really does 
seem to describe a reality.  It may be a reality only perceived by the writer, or even by the reader, 
but in some imaginative way it exists as a reality.  As such, it does not intend to be deceptive.    
The connection between literature and ideology is further developed by Eagleton in the 
Ideology of the Aesthetic, as he continues to note the similarities between ideology and aesthetics 
as defined by Immanuel Kant in relation to the world of the unknowable noumena.  Both realms 




importantly, both art and ideology attempt to connect the subjective individual to a universal 
reality.  In Eagleton’s view this is where the danger resides; whatever connects subjects to each 
other and to a universal can become ideological.  Matthew Sharpe has noted that is not just a 
case of all art being ideological, but in Eagleton’s view, the field of aesthetics developed as a 
way of transmitting ideology deeper into the individual subject, as ideology contains “an 
irreducible aesthetic component” (96). The sensus communis of aesthetic judgments “represents 
something like an ideal of the type of ‘subjective universality’ that ideologies aspire to in the 
political field,” as the subjective qualities of art become universally recognized as objective 
properties (Sharpe 106).  Just as the aesthetic object stands between the material and the abstract, 
ideology becomes the “cement” that holds subjects together, as it contains both “objective and 
subjective dimensions” (Sharpe 96).  Through a personal encounter with the artwork, the 
subjective experience takes on a necessary quality, and a worldview becomes naturalized.  In 
Eagleton’s view, it is “a mark of success that [ideology] will cease to be visible, integrating itself 
so deeply into the material practices of its subjects as to form their unsurpassable horizon” 
(Sharpe 104).  In this way, he proposes that the aesthetic elements are just rhetorical devices for 
persuasion, devices which can convincingly persuade a false understanding. Ultimately, in this 
view, the aesthetic elements of literature merely mask the ideological content, and must be 
removed in order to see the true nature of the work.   
However, even in Eagleton's argument against aesthetic value there seems to be space 
beyond ideology, as he claims in The Ideology of the Aesthetic that “if the aesthetic yields us no 
knowledge . . . it proffers us something arguably deeper: the consciousness, beyond all 
theoretical demonstration” (85).  Eagleton’s position demonstrates that aesthetic values relate the 




must be formed from conceptual elements; otherwise it would be incomprehensible and cease to 
function in the practical world.  Therefore, the aesthetic work which signifies reality as we 
cannot fully know it, as Eagleton admits, must be larger than ideology itself.  If there is an 
aesthetic component of ideology which is irreducible, that would suggest that there is core 
aesthetic quality which cannot be transformed as it is put to use as an ideological transmitter, 
something which escapes and continues to retain an ambiguous and indescribable nature. 
Ideology, unlike the noumenal world, can be known, as Eagleton and the other Marxists critics 
have demonstrated.  Furthermore, Eagleton admits that aesthetics presents something “deep,” 
which suggests a wider possibility of understanding.  Ideology, in contrast, does not seem to 
function as deeply.  It is the appearance that covers reality.  If ideology needs aesthetic form to 
penetrate into the consciousness of the individual, that process demonstrates that consciousness 
is already deeper in potential than the extent of ideology.  While it seems certain that ideology 
can seize aesthetic form in order to present itself as true and shortcut logical argument, it seems 
equally true that non-ideological motivations can use this same technique as well.  They can use 
this “space” beyond the practical to circumvent ideology. The depth of the connection between 
aesthetics and consciousness then allows for the formation of new concepts that may not 
correspond to existing ideology. 
Zizek similarly argues that every artistic object emerges from an ideological system and 
contains features of it, but his analysis has several important distinctions from Eagleton’s and is 
significant in developing the post-Althusserian sense of ideology.  Ideology, he argues in The 
Sublime Object of Ideology, is not a false consciousness, something which conceals the truth as a 
positively existing actuality.  Rather, ideology is a veil which covers the realization that there is 




used as an absolute truth from which multiple ideologies can be evaluated, ideology is the only 
available understanding when one constructs a view of reality. In the era of post-structural 
skepticism, ideology not only remains present, but is in fact all that is left.  In agreement with 
Eagleton’s view that the non-political is very much political, Zizek contends that fleeing 
ideology is indeed an ideological position, and his primary argument is to emphasize that history 
has not progressed to a point that is post-ideological.  
In his analysis, Zizek configures his theory of ideology on ideas introduced by the 
psychologist Jacques Lacan. The first idea is the concept of the point de capiton, a master 
signifier which fixes meaning to a particular point and confers meaning to all subsequent ideas 
built upon it.  Ideologically, Zizek notes, abstract ideas such as “Freedom,” “God,” 
“Communism,” etc., exist as master signifiers (“Sublime” 112). Additionally, Zizek uses Lacan’s 
psychological structuring scheme of the perception of reality, consisting of the three orders of the 
Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real.  The primary difficulty in understanding reality is the gap 
between the Real and the Symbolic.  We come to understand the world through the Symbolic, all 
of the cultural structures that organize and structure the world through conceptual thought, such 
as language, the law, etc. In contrast, the Real is the fundamental actualities which escape this 
categorization, but which still exerts an influence on “reality” as it is understood.  The Real “is 
an entity which, although it does not exist. .  .  . has a series of properties – it exercises a certain 
structural causality, it can produce a series of effects in the symbolic reality of subjects” (Zizek, 
“Sublime” 183).  Thus the Real is raw existence before it is understood in linguistic terms, and it 
is also what exists “left over” after reality is imperfectly described in language.   
In “The Spectre of Ideology,” Zizek develops his analysis further, attempting to construct 




expected, and emerges when one tries to avoid it (2)., Zizek notes that, paradoxically, “stepping 
out of (what we experience as) ideology is the very form of our enslavement to it” (“Spectre” 6). 
Labeling something ideological means that one is already taking an ideological perspective, it is 
not only a creation of the Symbolic world, but it is the “’naturalization’ of the symbolic order” 
which adds authority to its arbitrary existence and makes its Symbolic foundation appear as an 
absolute (Zizek, “Spectre” 11). The views created out of cultural contexts become regarded as 
necessary and essential outside of their particular culture. This creates a “pre-constructed space” 
in which every attempt to be objective or neutral is already determined in relation to the 
prevailing understanding.  As “discursive mechanisms that generate meaning,” Symbolic orders 
ground all further discourse, fabricating what is considered the natural order of things (Zizek, 
“Spectre” 17).  While generating meaning, rather than directly representing reality, ideology, as a 
part of this structure, exists only as an interpretation of the world, based upon master signifiers 
which are not naturally connected to the world they describe.  Therefore competing ideologies 
cannot be comparatively measured as right or wrong, as there is no objective non-interpretation 
existing at a more fundamental level from which they can be evaluated.  Because ideology is an 
interpretation of all experience, it marks the edge of thought itself, where there is no 
unincorporated cognitive space.  As an ever present condition, Zizek argues, ideology covers up 
basic antagonisms below the foundation of social existence; it covers up the gaps which the 
external world produces in the Real.  All cultural artifacts, particularly linguistic ones such as 
literature, will then necessarily contain ideological traces from their authorial construction. 
Ideology, as a limited construct, represents the “nontotalizable” or “nonrepresentable . . . 




sense, just false knowledge disseminated to hide the real power structures.  Zizek defines “the 
fundamental dimension of’ ideology as: 
not simply a 'false consciousness,' an illusory representation of reality, it is rather this 
reality itself which is already to be conceived as 'ideological' - 'ideological' is a social 
reality whose very existence implies the non-knowledge of its participants as to its 
essence - that is the social effectivity, the very reproduction of which implies that the 
individuals 'do not know what they are doing.' (“Sublime” 15) 
 
However, Zizek adds, they do in fact know what they are doing but still do it anyway.  As this 
cynicism arises, ideology continues to function in different modes.  Rather than just knowledge, 
it includes doctrine, belief, and ritual (Zizek, “Spectre” 11).  The world only appears post-
ideological if the illusion is placed in the realm of knowledge.   Because people do not take 
things seriously, but act as if they do anyway, ideology has moved into the world of action, 
becoming further immersed in culture, resulting in a world that is far from ideologically neutral.  
As a way of infusing meaning into the raw existence of the Real which has no inherent sense, 
ideology exists beyond being just a set of principles, it exists as a function.  It masks the 
nothingness underneath itself, but it not just a mask as it operates with a self-contained 
acknowledgement of its own non-foundational artificiality.  Persisting not as a mask hiding 
something, but rather as a mask hiding nothing, ideology thereby produces meaning from where 
there would be none. Those who grip onto ideology do so, not to reject a more genuine truth, but 
because the rejection of ideology would unravel the fabric of meaning, as Zizek describes: 
reality itself cannot reproduce itself without this so-called ideological mystification. The 
mask is not simply hiding the real state of things, the ideological distortion is written into 
its very essence . . .  [it] can reproduce itself only so far as it is ‘misrecognized and 
overlooked’: the moment we see it ‘as it really is,’ this being dissolves itself into 
nothingness or, more precisely, it changes into another kind of reality.  (“Sublime” 25) 
 
Because it is embedded in the very way ones sees the world, it cannot be detached for 




structuring their reality, their real social activity” (Zizek, “Sublime” 30).  The illusion is not 
contained within a knowledge or understanding of reality, it is rather “already on the side of 
reality itself” (Zizek, “Sublime” 29-30). This social activity found in reality is then based upon 
illusion, and activity is where the misunderstanding takes place.  Ideology is already at work 
before it is propagated by the Ideological State Apparatuses  described by Althusser; it is built 
into the fabric of social reality.  Ideology is then pressed upon the subject both from the top 
down, and from the bottom up.   
The significant question posed by Zizek’s analysis asks: is there any possible outside to 
ideology?  While there remains a danger that if “we come to ‘know too much,’ to pierce the true 
functioning of social reality, this reality would dissolve itself,” he does present the possibility of 
an outside (Zizek, “Sublime” 15).  Questioning the apparent assumption that there is an “inherent 
impossibility of isolating a reality whose consistency is not maintained by ideological 
mechanisms,” he asks is there ”a reality that does not disintegrate the moment we subtract from 
it its ideological component?” (Zizek, “Spectre” 15).  The conclusion he arrives at suggests it is 
some other kind of understanding, one not conceptual.  While: 
no clear line of demarcation separates ideology from reality, although ideology is already 
at work in everything we experience as ’reality’, we must none the less maintain the 
tension that keeps the critique of ideology alive . . ideology is not all; it is possible to 
assume a place that enables us to maintain a distance from it, but this place from which 
one can denounce ideology must remain empty, it cannot be determined by any positively 
determined reality – the moment we yield to this temptation, we are back in ideology. 
(Zizek, “Spectre” 17) 
 
 Zizek’s conclusion suggests that the awareness of ideology within cultural practices can best be 
achieved by replacing ideology with a theory of ideology.  Any other attempt, which contains a 
Symbolic understanding, will fail.  Attempts to achieve an “undistorted view of reality,” from 




subjective viewpoint, cannot be complete as there will always be a missing “non-symbolized 
traumatic kernel” of the Real (Zizek, “Spectre” 26).  
As an “unconscious fantasy,” ideology structures reality and since it is no longer a 
condition of knowledge which can be evaluated as false, but rather one embedded into reality, 
Zizek claims that not only are we far from a non-ideological world, we are even more immersed 
in it than in the past.  However, the Symbolic nature of ideology can eventually reveal itself as 
incomplete. There is not a “secret” something hiding behind an ideological curtain, the secret is 
the form of ideology itself, not hiding something, but baselessly supporting reality. Zizek notes 
the structural weakness, claiming that “(what we experience as) reality is not the ‘thing itself’, it 
is always-already symbolized, constituted, structured by symbolic mechanisms – and the 
problem resides in the fact that symbolization ultimately always fails, that it never succeeds in 
fully ‘covering’ the real,” (“Spectre” 21). The distortions produced by ideological perspectives 
can help reveal the conditions covered up by social structures.  Ideology contains a symptom, “a 
particular element that subverts its own universal foundation” (Zizek, “Sublime” 16).  A critique 
then must detect “a point of breakdown” within an ideological field which is “at the same time 
necessary for that field to achieve its closure, its accomplished form” (16).  Ideological 
universals always include particulars which “breaks its unity [and] lays open its falsity” (16).  
For instance, a society based on “freedom” will include something that the individual is not free 
to do because it would undermine the overall freedom.  Furthermore, as a universal feature, 
“there is no ideology that does not assert itself by means of delimiting itself from another ‘mere 
ideology’” (Zizek, “Spectre” 19).  There is always an “other”, something that is-not to define 
what is.  In appearance, what one believes is truth as defined by one’s culture as truth, while an 




However, an understanding of the Symbolic clarifies that there is a limit to any particular 
ideology, and no single one can attempt to encompass all of reality.  It cannot be completely 
coextensive with all of reality, and it contains its own internal negations, therefore it is not an 
impenetrable totality.  
Ideology is not one Symbolic construct which obscures a more accurate Symbolic 
system.  Rather, it covers the Real, which cannot be understood in conceptual terms. Following 
Lacan, Zizek defines “reality” as “a fantasy-construction which enables us to mask the Real of 
our desire and suggests that “the only way to break the power of our ideological dream is to 
confront the Real of our desire which announces itself in this dream” (“Sublime” 48).   Although 
Zizek argues that there is no objective “God’s view” from which to distinguish reality from 
ideology,  he acknowledges that there is a constant among all the possible contingent constructs: 
“this constant is the Lacanian Real that ‘remains the same in all possible universes (of 
observation)” (“Spectre” 25). When the particulars of any Symbolic system, such as language, 
culture, and ideology, are isolated, what remains will be consistent with the remains of all other 
Symbolic systems.  This “extra-ideological point of reference that authorizes us to denounce the 
content of our immediate experience as ‘ideological’ – is not reality but the repressed real of 
antagonism” (Zizek “Spectre” 25).  Thus, for Zizek, an essential aspect of the Real is social 
antagonism, which is not a class struggle that persists within the higher levels of ideology, but 
rather something that is repressed, or rejected, from the social constructs of the symbolic.  It 
remains consistent as something more fundamental than any ideological system.  Social 
antagonism, is for Zizek the “inherent limit” that surrounds society, remaining outside of the 
Symbolic, but forming a base for everything constructed within it.  Understanding this condition 




incomplete understanding, and additional conditions of the Real may apply as well, other forms 
of tension and contest that persist as universal qualities throughout reality and are always present 
in any human experience.   Stripped away of their artificial Symbolic constructions, these 
consistent experiences can be apprehended.  As Zizek’s analysis suggests, The Real is the only 
outside of ideology, and how it can be accessed is a difficult notion, but it seems that there is a 
possibility for artistic representation to provide an impression of it. 
The post-Marxist understanding of ideology reveals a problematic nature of literary 
theory is its attempt to discern clearer understanding.  It is not simply a matter of unmasking.  
Stripping away the extra-ideological content in order to reveal the underlying ideology at work 
cannot reach a fully fundamental level.  What the mask of ideology hides is not a uniform 
master-ideology which can be seen for what it is, and ultimately unlocked by defining it.  The 
“hard kernel” which is hidden through the ideological process is an external element to the 
Symbolic construct, it is the Real.  As such it cannot be decoded and described in conceptual 
terms, but remains elusive. The ideological project of literary theory can never be complete, it 
cannot grasp every element of the work or culture; every reading will fail to map and organize all 
of the thought contained within a work.  Furthermore, the inherent contradictions within an 
ideological system make it difficult to claim exactly what it is.  The overall meaning of the 
master-signifier can be viewed as central, but there will always be cases, as Zizek suggests, that 
negate or redefine that master-signifier. A final stable and uniform view which would pervade all 
artifacts produced within a culture and relate them to a particular meaning becomes difficult to 
ascertain.  The bottom, as a stable foundation precisely defining ideology, is unreachable in 




While the claim that all of literature is ideological because of its larger context involving 
the author and preexisting culture is unavoidably accurate, it must also be the case that the 
process of interpretation is always ideological.  Just as ideology is embedded in the production of 
written work, it is also embedded in the process of reading and understanding, and critical 
reactions will already be informed with a pre-determined viewpoint.  All critical interpretations 
will remain conceptual, and remain in an ideological context.  Alternatively, when a work is 
explored for the possibility of meanings which are created as a secondary result of its formal 
relations and its deliberate construction, something additional arises beyond its surface 
implications.   The aesthetic layer of a literary work, how language is used in an original and 
creative way to purposely interact with forms and ideas, presents the possibility of extra-
ideological meaning.  As something extending further in meaning than a conceptual system, the 
aesthetic essence may be able to provide a view of the Real while emanating from within the 
Symbolic.  The literary work, as it contains aesthetic qualities, does not possess a positively 
determined certainty in a final sense, but exists as an open and continuing invitation for 
questions, suggesting alternative views which subsist simultaneously. 
Reviewing the continuous Post-Marxist elaboration of ideology, Sharpe agrees that there 
has not been an end to ideology and, like Zizek and Eagleton, he notes that the danger of 
ideology is its ability to become invisible as it is integrated deeper and deeper into culture and 
continues to exert significant influence. “Contemporary cynical reason,” Sharpe argues, “instead 
shows up the deeper truth of ideology per se – which is that the deepest level of efficacy is 
beyond subjects’ conscious grasp, at the level of the Freudian unconscious” (108).  Although 
these examinations have revealed it to be a pervasive and extensive element of the social 




Both of these theorists have done that in their attempts at ideology-critique, which “maintain -
albeit in a way that neither has rigorously attempted- that ideology is distinguishable from other 
discourses and social practices, as a species of persuasive discourse whose ‘truth’ – if we wish to 
continue to use this term at all – will be judged by its fruits” (Sharpe 116).  The term “ideology,” 
he concludes, must be used specifically, as considering all politically persuasive discourse to be 
ideology would leave no room for an “outside” to ideology.   
The possibility of distinguishing ideology from other discourses then needs to be 
actualized.  In order to be able to analyze ideology it must retain a discrete uniqueness that 
differentiates it from other discourse.  Noting what differentiates literature from other writing 
seems to be a potential starting point for this, as literature contains qualities and features that are 
not present in all forms of discourse.  By centering ideology on a sublime fantasy, a master 
signifier, Zizek’s conception of it does create an external space, occupied by “the other”.  Those 
who do share the fantasy become a threat to the particular way of life and are exiled into the 
outside realm of competing ideologies.  As a self-sustaining system without appeal to a more 
fundamental truth, ideology relies on the use of language from which it is constructed.  In order 
to be transmittable and comprehensible, ideology must employ concepts that are explicit and 
must therefore be sustained by continual reuse of presumed language to support its own internal 
logic. It must be capable of being contained as a doctrine.   In The Plague of Fantasies, Zizek 
refers to the Lacanian realm of the Real where we encounter the other as "beyond the wall of 
language" (49).  This description marks the boundary where the explicitness of concepts end and 
the grasp of ideology ceases.  As Sharpe notes, in Zizek’s critique there is always a “remainder” 
that escapes, as it “exceeds the complete grasp of hegemonic ideology” (108).  Any existence 




purposes, this remainder, until it is transfigured and conceptualized into an ideological form, 
would seem to be available for the artwork to present as an aesthetic experience free from 
ideological constraint and pre-interpretation.  Art, through its attempts at expanding the horizon 
of perception, introduces newness into the world, and this newness can disrupt the consistency 
which supports ideology. 
Questions for literary theory arise as a result of Eagleton and Zizek’s advanced 
understanding of ideology. How can literature transcend this cultural state, and what meaning 
does it provide as an aesthetic construction? If theory resolves the problem of ideology being 
glossed over and ignored, is it then possible that Eagleton’s understanding is an overreaction 
which misplaces the artistic nature of literature while foregrounding the dynamic forces of 
culture?  
In “Reclaiming the Aesthetic,” George Levine argues that this is the case, as the change 
in literary criticism of the late twentieth century has shifted from interpretation to theory, 
resulting in “a reductive assimilation of literature to ideology, or to a resistant sense that the 
literature and the political should have nothing to do with each other” (1). This change in literary 
study “from questions about what texts might ‘mean’ to questions about the systems that contain 
them, about material conditions, hermeneutics, mediation, [and] discourse” has transformed it 
into a study of culture where “literature is all too often demeaned, [and] the aesthetic experience 
denigrated or reduced to mystified ideology” (Levine 2-3).  
In response, Levine proposes that the aesthetic is “a mode engaged richly and complexly 
with moral and political issues, but a mode that operates differently from others and contributes 
in distinctive ways to the possibilities of human fulfillment and connection” (3). This 




such in order to keep literature from becoming just a resource for anthropology and to avoid “the 
sort of reductivism that comes to equate aesthetics with ideology, or to subsume it under 
ideology” (Levine 8). In challenging the theoretical dismissal of “the aesthetic as a strategy of 
mystification of the status quo,” Levine argues that the aesthetic cannot be understood in the 
same way as other types of discourse (3).  Because of its nature, which provides multiplicity of 
meaning and concerns questions of value, literature cannot be defined with the same singular 
precision in regard to meaning.  As Levine suggests,  the aesthetic realm provides “free play” 
which can result in political views becoming “short circuited” and “ provides a space where the 
immediate pressures of ethical and political decisions are deferred, so it allows sympathy for, and 
potential understanding of people, events, things otherwise threatening” (17).  While there may 
always be underlying political content, “the aesthetic has no particular political commitments. It 
leaves itself open to endless and indeterminate interpretations. It offers, in the options society can 
create, the closest thing to ‘free choice,’ the least oppressive of its forms” (Levine 18).  
Levine’s articulation of the state of theory suggests that centering the focus back on the 
aesthetic nature of literature is indispensable in challenging the ideological forces at work.  By 
elevating the discussion into an aesthetic realm, literature can become an active part of that 
political contest.  It creates an open field for the reader to evaluate the political conditions and 
choose what to emphasize and pursue as important.  By “deferring” any political conclusions, 
aesthetic works can reflect on the given ideological field, and if not politically neutral, can, at 
least, allow for alternate views to come into contact with the normalized conditions and prompt a 
continued modification or evolution of them. Awareness of the potential of the aesthetic to 
reconfigure the political discussion, rather than allowing aesthetic form to be a passive device to 




class of discourse.  Through the process of interpretation and consideration of the work, the 
reader can be individually moved as an agent, detached from the mass of society.  While a work 
may indicate the magnitude of past ideological forces, there is an openness in relation to the 
future as the work continues to exert meaning.  Neither the work nor the reader must be confined 
to the state of thought previously embedded within the culture. 
Peter Brooks is another voice in the argument that poetics has been lost in the study of 
literature.  In “What Happened to Poetics?,” he suggests that the “play of the aesthetic” resides 
alongside the creation of language as a significant part of human activity, “trumping the aesthetic 
by the ideological and political – making the aesthetic simply as a mask for the ideological- risks 
losing a sense of the functional role played by the aesthetic within human existence” (Brooks 
160).   Arguing that ideology does not encompass all of human life, Brooks claims: 
More than politics in the usual acceptation, it is cultural politics that absorb much of our 
anxiety about values.  And, if this demonstrates that culture is indeed the realm of 
ideological debate, it nonetheless confirms that culture, including the aesthetic, is a 
constituted realm that cannot simply be reduced to ideology.  (162) 
 
Culture, although built on the same foundation as ideology, is something larger than it, including 
all of the aesthetic appreciation of the world that is put into play by humanity which expands life 
beyond the purely functional.   
Poetics, in his view, is the most important component of aesthetic form since it relates to 
the production of meaning, and through poetics literature creates value which is beyond 
ideology.  Rather than bypassing the aesthetic in any reading, the reader must “slow up the work 
of interpretation, the attempt to turn the text into some other discourse or system” in order to 
consider the possibilities of the work.  What the reader “needs,” argues Brooks, is to: 
encounter a moment of poetics- a moment in which they are forced to ask not only what 




are, and how we as readers, through the competence we have gained by reading other 
texts, activate and deploy systems that allow us to detect or create meaning and to 
rationalize and order meanings in categorical ways.  (160-61) 
 
The position Brooks asserts here suggests a much more active engagement between the reader 
and the work.  The moment of poetics, the point of aesthetic experience, is what literature is 
about, and should be allowed to take place before the reader transposes that experience into a 
conceptual form that can be used to build new layers of meaning through understanding.  
Meaning is “created,” “rationalized” and “ordered” by the reader.   Rather than being a passive 
recipient of an ideological transmission, the reader creates new meaning out of the aesthetic 
presentation and decides as a matter of value-judgment how that meaning compares to existing 
ones.   The attention to meaning-making is also important, as it realizes that new meaning is 
created and that the literary does not just recycle existing notions.  Furthermore, Brooks contends 
that critical positions which assert the primacy of ideology, like Eagleton’s, assume “a measure 
of moral arrogance” in which the analyst knows more than the author, text, or reader (164).  
Rather, he counters, “one cannot claim to speak for the text until one has attempted to let the text 
speak though itself” (Brooks 165).  
The concise point Brooks articulates here suggests the most reasonable method of 
approaching literature.  While there are certainly political and ideological notions residing within 
a work which can later be revealed for other gains in knowledge, they should not become the 
primary concern of reading.  Reading only for ideological content risks projecting ideology into 
the work where it was not previously present.  Additionally, just as the reader, or critic, should 
not attempt to dominate the work, it should not attempt to dominate the reader to force an 
ideological conclusion, as that would diminish the artistic priority that the work attempts to 




viewed from an external position, his claims supporting the importance of poetic meaning 
suggest that the aesthetic characteristics of a literary work provide meaning on alternate levels 
which transcend the ideological content. 
Similarly, Lou F. Caton argues that recent theory has not resolved the conflicts found 
within literature, but has just reversed the privileged position and “now ideology, not aesthetics, 
totally interprets literary production” (64). This new model, following Eagleton, views aesthetics 
as nothing but “a sham that masks crucial relations” and “simply an illusion” which arises from 
the specific ideological content of a social context (Caton 67).  The point of studying literature 
has simply become the “social investigations of materialism” (Caton 67).   
In contrast to recent theory, Caton attempts to resolve the dualism, and frames the 
problem as one between formalism and ideology, arguing that the tension between ideology and 
aesthetic form is what actually produces the significant meaning.  Anti-formalist criticism can 
make works representative of the local culture only. A recognition of formalism, however, 
reveals the universal relevance of the work, as "attention to aesthetic form . . . provides an 
idealistic counter-force to the important but limited materialism of politics and ideology” (Caton 
66).  He argues that dismissing aesthetic form for ideological content is counterproductive, as 
both are necessary for discerning meaning; form makes the material content intelligible.    
Rather than viewing literature as allegory, which creates practical parallels, Caton argues 
that it should be viewed as symbolic.  Considering the view of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, he finds 
resolution in the symbol which creates unity and overcomes the difference between discrete 
components, unlike metaphor.  Symbols point to an idealistic state beyond the material world of 
ideology, a realm “which is unspeakable, unknowable, and beyond the conceptual mind” and 




of aesthetics, “form embodies the clash between history and idealism in terms of the temporal 
and eternal, [and] it can operate as a bridge between diverse ideological cultures” (Caton 72). It 
is through the aesthetic form of the symbol that “all culture can experience [the] idealized 
moment when temporal concepts (i.e., the mortal, interested concerns of ideology and history) 
create a certain form (the symbol) that reveals eternity (i.e., the metaphysical, disinterested 
concerns of idealism)" (Caton 70).  The symbol attempts to reveal the world of Kant's noumena 
to "create a single idealistic moment," but it can never completely bring the ideal into the 
material, as “the translucent experience . . . never completely exits the temporal, ideological 
world.  It offers only a foggy glimpse of the unreachable, beckoning ideal of a pure, disinterested 
formalism, and it always does so through the material world” (70).  Although this revelation of 
the ideal is only “foggy’, it does contribute to importing meaning into the existing world.  
Symbolism, Caton continues: 
gives the reader a new fact, a new experience, rather than the material commentary that 
primarily springs from allegory . . . because symbol's form always adds up to more than 
its merged parts, the symbol gives us something new, something that cannot exist in the 
finite, propositional world of ideology.” (70 -71) 
 
Precise definition of these symbols is impossible, as “these ideal symbols are inaccessible, 
‘transcendental’ in that they are ‘outside’ experience.  We can have no clear concrete grounding 
for ideals because they are not organized through conceptual understandings” (Caton 72). 
However, Caton realizes that the symbol retains all of its original meanings even when it is 
formed from differentiated concepts and "this makes no rational sense; hence, the recognition 
that all symbols are contradictions" (69).  Art, through its symbolic nature, is beyond the 




The idea that aesthetic properties, and the symbols they work through, involve 
contradictions shows that the ideas they attempt to represent cannot be placed into propositional 
terms.  Therefore, symbolic or poetic works cannot do the same kinds of things that the 
performative statements of doctrine can.  The ambiguity found within them makes them less 
optimal for achieving a specific result, as ideology would attempt to do. They can, however, 
ultimately do more than that kind of discourse can with its restricted language. Revising them 
into less contradictory statements destroys part of the contained meaning, as it confines aesthetic 
elements into an artificial rationalized limitation. 
Caton’s view contributes to the escape of ideology by pointing to the world outside of 
language, the noumena, or the Real in Lacanian terms, and suggests a method of accessing it 
through the symbol.  Furthermore, this view acknowledges that aesthetic form produces 
something “new” beyond ideological concepts which are “propositional.”  However, his 
formalism relies upon a realm of universal ideals; for him aesthetics is "the universal form of 
[the symbol’s] structure" (Caton 70).  In his view, these newly formed concepts, brought into the 
material world through language, were already pre-existing, as a Platonic form would be.  This 
conflicts with the idea of “newness” in art.  He mentions concepts like justice, dignity, and 
community (Caton 71).  However, these concepts have historically developed over time and been 
experienced differently in the context of various cultures.  It seems doubtful that one reads 
literature in order to clearly perceive ideas of this nature, looking for a demonstration of 
something like perfect justice.  It is ideology, rather, that offers the apparently pure conceptual 
conditions that society attempts to attain.   
While Caton's argument reinforces the importance of aesthetic form and realizes the 




forms.  Rather than viewing the objects of aesthetic inquiry as universal forms, but rather as 
simply the unarticulated experience of the Real, the problems of idealism can be avoided.  If 
concepts like democracy, justice, and equality are experienced as evolving ideas rather than 
entering the world as fully formed pre-existing ideas, then they must be something introduced at 
some point as new.   This newness, the introduction of the novel idea, is one function that art 
performs, providing something that helps break through the rigid forms of ideology and 
energizes progress.  The meaning proposed by an aesthetic form does not have to be a concept 
which has an eternal, immaterial, and ontologically distinct existence.  Rather, what the aesthetic 
can reveal is the raw, undefined experience of reality which has existence prior to meaning.  
Specific discourse of a particular political context attempts to reduce description of the Real into 
a Symbolic expression, confining it in linguistic terms which are unable to fully encompass the 
depth of experience.  Literature, through expression at the level of aesthetic form adds layers of 
meaning beyond the literal surface meaning and rediscovers some of this depth.  The reader is 
then directed toward contemplating the raw experience which is consistent across all cultures, 
despite political particulars, as experience which is universal, but encountered within the 
limitations of the material world.  It points toward the pre-ideological, before experience 
becomes sliced up, processed, and contained within a certain set of concepts which are bound to 
an ideological master-signifier that limits thought within the space of ideas surrounding, and 
connected to, that particular point. 
As one example of recent theory, William Shakespeare's play The Tempest is widely 
regarded as an allegory of colonial expansion. Ideologically, the play could be said to promote 
and defend the British assimilation of the New World.  As a highly aesthetic work, containing 




be incomplete and fail to address all of the multivalent properties of the play.  Superficially, 
themes concerning the nature of drama and the existence of the self stand out as much as the 
confrontation between cultures and the disproportionate distributions of power which arise from 
such confrontations. 
Meredith Anne Skura, in “Discourse and the Individual: The Case of Colonialism in The 
Tempest," has argued against such interpretations and their inherent potential danger, as criticism 
of The Tempest has shifted away from overly narrow readings of the play as “a self-contained 
project of a self-contained individual” which ignored the political context, to criticism fully 
engaged with the historical situation (46). While attempting to overcome a “blindness” to 
ideological context, this recent criticism:  
not only flattens the text into the mold of colonialist discourse and eliminates what is 
characteristically ‘Shakespearian’ in order to foreground what is ‘colonialist,’ but it is 
also –paradoxically- in danger of taking the play further from the particular historical 
situation in England in 1611 even as it brings it closer to what we mean by ‘colonialism’ 
today. (47) 
 
This much broader interpretation is potentially too wide and ignores “traditional insights about 
the text, its immediate sources, its individual author – and his individual psychology” (47).  This 
method risks a “circularity of definition” that assumes the presence of ideological content, and 
then proceeds to “discover” it within the text (47).  In hindsight, criticism can reveal the trends 
which have advanced the colonialist project, but without the concept of such an idea existing as a 
valid articulation in 1611 the emergence of it into the foreground is limited to a contemporary 
understanding.  Interpretation must avoid this pre-determined conclusion. Rationalizations or 
justifications of the political unconscious from the point of origin, Skura argues, must be taken 
into account, “otherwise interpretation not only destroys the text – here The Tempest- as a unique 




colonialist discourse; it also destroys the evidence of the play as a unique cultural artifact, a 
unique voice in the discourse” (51).  In response to the ideology of the time, Skura finds 
particular scenes advancing an anti-colonialist view, as the play “qualifies Prospero’s scorn by 
showing Caliban’s virtues,” and reveals Prospero’s acknowledgement of his own tendency 
toward colonialization (49).  While the political unconscious of the culture is contained within 
the play, Skura suggests that the process of interpretation must recognize the presence of a 
personal conscious at work within the authorship and concludes that Shakespeare’s participation 
in colonialist ideology was not mere reproduction, but a process of “crossing it with other 
discourses, changing, enlarging, skewing, and questioning it” (69).   
Skura’s point of differentiating today’s understanding of colonialism in relation to the 
understanding of the time is an important one.  While The Tempest is put to use as an example of 
Western culture’s exclusion of “the other,” that aspect is not necessarily an inherent meaning of 
the play.  In the case of The Tempest, "colonialism" did not exist as a coherent idea and, without 
a defined field of discourse relating to it, discussion of such trends would have to exist without 
clear terms to oppose it.  As ideology produces the norms and defines the limit for what is not 
included, those in excluded positions begin to crystalize their own identity.  Historically, as 
imperialist motivations pushed Western culture further beyond European borders, the encounter 
with “the other” eventually allowed for the idea of “colonialism” to evolve as a concrete idea and 
become a criticism for evaluation of the dominant, reflecting back on historic progress.  
Shakespeare’s language in reference to Caliban appears, superficially, to propagate the dominant 
ideology of the superiority of European civilization.  Addressing his uncivilized nature as a “vile 
race,” Shakespeare brings into the foreground what would have existed in the presupposed 




normalized truth is called into question.  Furthermore, the critical connections between the wider 
cultural practices and the work as a particular view of that practice may not achive a complete 
consistency.  As an artistic creation, the play must be understood as emanating from an 
individual point of view which cannot be identical to the collective cultural point of view. Even 
though the personal thoughts and intentions of the author cannot be known, the work is to some 
degree detached from the total cultural practice, and the resulting process of individual 
authorship differentiates the work from a purely cultural product. Although any resulting work 
cannot escape containing political viewpoints in relation to the prevailing ideology, the internal 
ambiguities can change the angle of relation to the dominant view. 
Barbara Fuchs has also pointed out that such a reading can be an oversimplification, and 
even a colonialist interpretation must uncover the multiple layers that contribute to the political 
construction of the work.  In “Conquering Islands: Contextualizing The Tempest,” she notes that 
“it is an axiom of contemporary criticism that The Tempest is a play about the European colonial 
experience in America” (Fuchs 265).  Placing America at the center of interpretation, in her 
view, “has made it fundamentally more interesting and, at least for twentieth-century readers, a 
more relevant text.”  This assertion suggests, in agreement with Jonathan Culler, that use is more 
interesting than interpretation.   However, Fuchs argues that it is an advantage in political 
criticism to consider “all relevant colonial contexts simultaneously” and contends that the play 
can lead to multiple historical interpretations (266).  While more engaging for contemporary 
audiences, an interpretation based only on a New World reading “runs the risk of obscuring the 
complicated nuances of colonial discourses.” (Fuchs 265). Meaning is ultimately more 
complicated, and Fuchs adds that “just as formal literary elements of a text  - metaphors, puns, 




Imperialism in the Americas, she claims, should be understood as a parallel to British expansion 
into Ireland.  Furthermore, the Mediterranean setting of the play represents Islamic expansion 
into Europe.  All of these political situations exist “superimposed” in the play, as “quotations” of 
each other (266). While references to previous exploration and assimilation “advances a 
colonialist ideology,” Fuch notes Michael Neill’s argument that such quotations can also “serve 
to counter colonialism” and escape working “entirely to the conquerors’ advantage” (268n).  As 
a conquering group identifies the colonized inhabitants as an “other,” those inhabitants can be 
organized around such labels and strengthen their own national identities. 
As suggested by Fuchs, The Tempest is a “complex and polysemous” work where 
“multiple dimensions come together” (285).  If these multiple levels of content are ignored, then 
the play becomes “isolated somewhere in the Americas,” and a significant amount of potential 
meaning becomes rejected.  Viewing the play as predominantly an aesthetic reworking of the 
cultural forces, rather than a simple product of those forces, allows the specific contexts and 
ideologies to retain their significance independently, while telling a larger story that is applicable 
to all of them. 
In contrast to the prominent ideological themes uncovered by theory, the criticism of 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, published in 1836, stands out.  In his opinion: 
The Tempest is a specimen of the purely romantic, in which the interest is not historical, 
or dependent upon fidelity of portraiture, or the natural connexion of events, - but is the 
birth of the imagination, and rests only on the coadaptation and the union of the elements 
granted to, or assumed by the poet.  It is a species of drama which owes no allegiance to 
time or space, and in which, therefore, errors of chronology and geography – no mortal 
sins in any species- are venial faults, and count for nothing.  It addresses itself entirely to 
the imaginative faculty. (Coleridge 121) 
 
Concluding that the language of the work is “for all ages,” Coleridge’s criticism emphasizes the 




show aesthetic transcendence (125).  This approach does lack an awareness of the specific 
political and cultural currents that shift over time, and although it is incomplete, it also reveals 
what is lacking in theory: the more general meanings that rise above contextual origins.  If theory 
ties the work too closely to the place and time of its origin, this aesthetic approach largely 
disconnects the work from the world, presenting it in an abstract environment which disengages 
the reader.  A more conditioned response, allowing both cultural and aesthetic analysis to take 
place simultaneously increases the possibility for more meanings to emerge, and increases the 
value of a work.  
The possible meanings found within The Tempest are most apparent in relation to central 
characters, namely Prospero, rather than Shakespeare’s intention as an author, or the originating 
culture.  Nevertheless, the artistic nature of the language creates a wealth of harmonic meaning 
that includes all these layers.  This is perhaps most prominent in Prospero’s speech in Act IV, 
scene 1: 
Our revels now are ended. These our actors, 
As I foretold you, were all spirits and 
Are melted into air, into thin air: 
And, like the baseless fabric of this vision, 
The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces, 
The solemn temples, the great globe itself, 
Ye all which it inherit, shall dissolve 
And, like this insubstantial pageant faded, 
Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff 
As dreams are made on, and our little life 
Is rounded with a sleep. (4.1.146-158) 
 
A central idea within The Tempest involves the disorder that surrounds artificial order.  The 
natural world ultimately holds a priority over the political inter-subjective world of social 
constructs.  Prospero’s place within a political hierarchy of the civilized world is not a natural 




legitimized by a self-constructed authority which can be usurped.  Although restoration to the 
rightful state of things occurs at the end of the play, the fragile, contingent, and insubstantial, 
nature of this order begins to appear underneath the surface world.   
Showing a self-awareness, this notion has many layers of meaning revolving around the 
awareness of a larger structure beyond the narrative, and beyond Shakespeare’s own 
biographical experience of the stage.  Prospero’s own island, existing in a world of magic apart 
from the political civilized world is a parallel to the world of drama existing apart and within the 
“real” world.  Within the theme of art versus nature, Prospero’s speech describes an artificiality 
to the reality we experience, a world constructed through culture and human endeavor that is not 
essential.  It therefore calls into question everything that is assumed as having a naturalized 
existence.  Suggesting a layered reality, there is a hint here at the divide between the Lacanian 
orders of the Real and the Symbolic, the Real being a disordered foundation to reality, while 
experienced reality is understood through Symbolic means of language and culture. In this case, 
a Lacanian understanding of reality is not embedded within the work; it is not an interpretation 
waiting to be revealed, or decoded, as correct.  However, like the Freudian understandings of 
psychology brought into interpretations of Hamlet, there is a vague notion present within the 
work which eventually becomes understood in more precise terms as new theoretical frameworks 
become available.  As a story of the struggle between two worlds, one naive and simple, and one 
made complex and corrupt, the work may support a view of the artificiality of culture, in which 
the political hierarchy is not a natural condition.  At one level, Zizek’s view of reality as a fragile 
construct which can be undone by “too much” knowing is dramatically presented. The Tempest 
suggests that the world of ideology is all we have, as an artificial construct in an unorganized 




As an artistic work, The Tempest does not promote a single ideological position and does 
not advance one by covering it up. Rather, by foregrounding the notion of colonialization, it 
creates space for an ideological discourse, inspiring analysis of different views for consideration. 
As much as a literary work reveals the dominant ideology, it also reveals the traces of conflict 
within a society.  Art becomes the field where ideas can be brought into play, a step which is a 





Chapter 2: Interpretation, Overinterpretation and Use 
In determining meaning, particularly political meaning in relation to the culture, there 
arises a problem of intention.  Suggesting that the final work is completely detached from any 
intention, or conscious input of the author in relation to culture, results in the literary process 
becoming mere transmission, and ignores active agency.  However, since the author’s intention 
cannot be fully known, there is a gap between the work and its origin.  In some cases there is 
simply no supplemental information about the author, or there is no further commentary from the 
author.  Even in cases where this supplementary material exists, it remains detached from the 
work, as another level of discourse, and not an integral part of the aesthetic result.  When the 
original ideas are incorporated into a literary form, the possibilities of meaning become 
multiplied.  Just as this gap between the work and the author exists, a broader level of removal 
persists, existing as a distance between the work and the context of its origin.  If the author 
cannot have final say over the meaning of a work, then neither can the culture, which exists as a 
preliminary background before the active process of writing.   
The acts of writing and reading are individual experiences: the writer contemplates ideas 
in relation to the larger world, and the reader uses the work to aid in reflection on his or her own 
relation to the world.  Throughout this process only the work itself as a medium, a static artifact, 
remains stable. The ideas proposed by the author become transposed as they are encoded into the 
linguistic terms that constitute the work.  As the reader decodes these linguistic structures, his or 
her own conceptions, understandings, and cultural contexts influence the resulting interpretation, 
which creates another transposition.  The literary nature of the work bypasses the cognitive 
structure that a linear, logical argument would provide, allowing multiple influences to color the 




experience of the reader will not coincide with the experience of the writer.  While there are 
nearly unlimited possibilities of meaning for any work, if the most precise encounter of it as 
literature is a concern, the reader cannot casually use the work, but must be a critical, or 
responsible, reader and actively engage with the work.  The responsible reader is one who 
realizes that a work consists of many layers which provide alternate senses of meaning, ones that 
not even the author can fully realize.  But, this reader will also be aware that not just any 
interpretation or understanding will be faithful to the work itself, and must differentiate between 
meaning which is consistent with the unique work and “use” which views the work in the realm 
of external context and decentralizes meaning outside of the work. 
Umberto Eco has introduced the idea of overinterpretation, a condition where the reader 
injects his or her own ideas into the interpretation of the work, resulting in a meaning that is not 
fully supported.   As the reader analyzes a work, he or she will look for the features expected to 
be there, and interpret what is there in relation to that expectation, ultimately finding grounds for 
his or her own pre-supposed ideas.  If this method is considered valid, then all attempts at 
interpretation fail.  If all interpretations are correct, then none are correct, in the sense of being 
tightly based on the work as the source.  There has to be a limit to the acceptable interpretations, 
Eco argues.  Furthermore, Eco suggests that there is a division between interpretation and use of 
literature.  As cultural products, literary works undoubtedly reveal traits of the originating 
culture, many of which were probably transparent to the author.  Through analysis, like that of 
literary theory, the work is understood historically in the cultural context, and these patterns can 
be cognitively revealed.  In this way literature can be effectively used to provide further 




work.  Acknowledging this involvement of the author places limits of the possible interpretations 
which can be said to accurately result from examining the work.  
In Interpretation and Overinterpretation, Eco argues that literary interpretation has a 
point where the discovered interpretations begin to lose focus on meanings emerging directly 
from the work, resulting in overinterpretation that allows external influences to color the 
meaning of the work.  Interpretation, if it is to continue as a valid term, must have a respect for 
the work while it takes into consideration the “cultural and linguistic background” (Eco, 
“Overinterpretation” 69). In Eco’s view, “every act of reading is a difficult transaction between 
the competence of the reader (the reader’s world knowledge) and the kind of competence that a 
given text postulates in order to be read in an economic way” (68). Literature is constructed 
specifically with the understanding that readers will have to make interpretations, and contains a 
certain amount of complexity beneath the apparent surface. Therefore, there are certain 
expectations involved in making interpretations that the reader will need to recognize.   As a 
result of this complexity, there are no definite “correct” interpretations that could be discovered, 
even with help from the author.  However, that does not mean that all interpretations avoid being 
equally misplaced.   Eco argues that “if there are no rules that help to ascertain which 
interpretations are the ‘best’ ones, there is at least a rule for ascertaining which ones are ‘bad’” 
(52).  Defining a good interpretation involves consistency with other parts of the work that 
avoids any contradictions with “explicit aspects” of it, as:   
The only way is to check it upon the text as a coherent whole . . . any interpretation given 
of a certain portion of a text can be accepted if it confirmed by, and must be rejected if it 
is challenged by, another portion of the same text.  In this sense the internal textual 
coherence controls the otherwise uncontrollable drives of the reader. (Eco, 
“Overinterpretation” 65) 
 




discovery of meaning. 
Within this process of interpreting the literary work, Eco notes that there is “a non-literal 
sense to be detected . . . beyond and beneath the literal sense” (54). These multiple layers of 
meaning are all appropriate sources to consider in constructing interpretations. Eco adds: 
It is legitimate for a reader to find what he finds in the text, because the associations are, 
at least potentially, evoked by the text, and because the poet might (perhaps 
unconsciously) have created some ‘harmonics’ to the main theme. If it is not the author, 
let us say it is the language which has created this echo effect. (62)  
 
It is these “harmonic” effects produced through aesthetic construction that make literature 
distinct from other discourse. Through psychological factors, as well as the restrictions and 
enhancements produced by available language, meaning is complexified, and depth is added, 
creating a more interesting cultural product which is worthy of study as something in itself.  The 
use of language in a way that has inherent multiplicity of meaning, and supports rather than 
reduces this quality, will project meaning beyond any original sense, causing the work to be 
somewhat distanced from its point of origin. 
While Eco does place some importance on the intention of the author, who could possibly 
rule out bad interpretations which distort the intended meaning of the work, he also recognizes 
that the work will involve more than just the writer’s intention.  Since the actual author cannot 
even be aware of the totality of meanings produced, he or she could merely reject interpretations 
in relation to particular elements considered in the creation of a work. However, the author 
cannot validate, positively or negatively, all of the possible meanings, and must remain, in Eco’s 
term “silent.” Ultimately, the “empirical author’s intention [is] radically useless,” and Eco 
attempts to avoid the problems of considering authorial intention (66).  Rather, he attempts to 




is an intention of the work, the intentio operis, which is distinct from the intention of the author.  
This intention guides meaning which is coherent with the entire work, but which is beyond the 
conscious awareness of the author.  By shifting priority to the work and “respecting the text,” the 
significant meanings can be found within the work itself.  By centering on the work, the process 
of interpretation asks “if what is found is what the text says by virtue of its textual coherence and 
of an original underlying signifying system, or what the addressees found in it by virtue of their 
own systems of expectations” (Eco, “Overinterpretation” 64).  
If the resulting discoveries are coherent with the work, the conclusions can accurately be 
considered interpretations. Although the reader does not have to understand the psychological 
intentions of the author, the originating context of the work must be kept in mind, and meaning 
must be understood in the language of the time, as forcing modern connotations into words 
distorts the original meaning of the work itself.  If, however, the discovered meaning is not 
consistent with all parts of the work, and the reader has injected his or her own expectations into 
the work, the result will be overinterpretation.  The conclusions of this type fall into a category 
that Eco defines as use (“Limits” 62).   The result is something different from interpretation and, 
as meaning is decentered, the work becomes one part of a larger idea or system and serves as an 
example of that external entity. 
Rather than being two purely distinct methods of approaching a literary work, Eco claims 
that there are points where interpretation and use overlap, and the reader can do both 
simultaneously.  He suggests that “it is reasonable that the reader has the right to enjoy all of 
[the] echo effects that the text qua text provides him or her. But at [a certain] point the act of 
reading becomes a terrain vague where interpretation and use inextricably merge together” (Eco, 




external to itself and reveal aspects of language or culture larger than the work’s immediate 
range of concern, while remaining internally consistent.  This kind of use remains important, as 
the work can tell the reader something about itself, while commenting on cultural phenomena at 
the same time.  As long as this use remains consistent with the work as a coherent whole, it 
remains viable as an interpretation.  However, as use overtakes interpretation, it becomes ever 
more important to remain focused on the work itself if one is attempting to say something about 
the work as it is. 
The claim that there is the possibility of “bad” interpretations is further expanded on by 
Eco in The Limits of Interpretation, where he considers a Medieval understanding of 
interpretation, and views aesthetics as “a secret science of symbols as intuitive revelations that 
can be neither verbalized nor conceptualized . . . something that sends one back to a mysterious 
and self-contradictory reality” (18). Since symbols lead to further symbols, deferring definition, 
Eco claims that “the meaning of a text is postponed. The only meaning of a text is ‘I mean 
more.’” (27). While symbols are themselves open to infinite possibilities, the meanings 
constructed from them are finite in terms of “interpretations allowed by the context” of the work 
(Eco, “Limits” 21).  This does not mean that “a text has a unique meaning, guaranteed by some 
interpretive authority. It means, on the contrary that any act of interpretation is a dialectic 
between openness and form, initiative on the part of the interpreter and contextual pressure” (21). 
The interpretive goal Eco strives for is a middle path between “two poles,” avoiding the search 
for one specific interpretation that may have been intended by the author and put into code 
within the work, and on the other side, “unlimited semiosis” where the work can mean anything 




to reach an agreement about the nature of a given text does not mean either (a) that the 
interpreters must trace back to the original intention of its author or (b) that such a text 
must have a unique a final meaning. There are . . . “open” texts that support multiple 
interpretations, and any common agreement about them ought to concern just their open 
nature and the textual strategies that make them work that way . . . even though the 
interpreters cannot decide which interpretation is the privileged one, they can agree on 
the fact that certain interpretations are not contextually legitimated. (41) 
 
The literary work, unlike other types of discourse, is “conceived in order to magnify such a 
semiotic possibility” (45) and contains “certain structural devices that elicit interpretive choices” 
(50).  There is an intentional attention to the possibilities that will be recognized, and the author 
will encourage such magnification. Nevertheless, the work retains a particular core that remains 
from the authorial construction which, at least, sets a direction for the worldview that emerges 
from it. Although the work stands as the one fixed point from which interpretations can be 
evaluated, Eco acknowledges that previous criticism and interpretation come into play, “since 
any new interpretation enriches the text,” adding to the history and significance surrounding a 
particular work.  
An artistic work, in Eco’s terms, invites reading by a “critical interpreter.”  This reader 
will retain an awareness of the centrality of the work and will interpret in order to say something 
about the work and not about something external to it. Critical interpretation “means to read it in 
order to discover, along with our reactions to it, something about its nature. To use a text means 
to start from it in order to get something else, even accepting the risk of misinterpreting it from 
the semantic point of view.” (Eco, “Limits” 57). This critical interpreter is “entitled to try infinite 
conjectures,” but that does mean that all of them are valid, or equally applicable (59).  In Eco’s 
view: 
To defend the rights of interpretation against the mere use of a text does not mean that 
texts must never be used. We are using texts every day and we need to do so, for 




empirical reading is always a mixture of both . . . Sometimes to use texts means to free 
them from previous interpretations, to discover new aspects of them, to realize that before 
they had been illicitly interpreted, to find out a new and more explicative intentio operis, 
that too many uncontrolled intentions of the readers had polluted and obscured. (62) 
 
The distinction is important if one wants to retain the exclusive qualities that give literature a 
discrete and unique presence among all cultural artifacts. 
While overinterpretation is the projection of pre-determined meaning into the 
interpretation of a work, it could be argued that dismissing certain possibilities of interpretation 
is really a problem of underinterpretation.  This is the position that Jonathan Culler takes as a 
response to Eco in The Literary in Theory, arguing that all interpretations are good because they 
can provide something useful.  Because he sets limits, stopping the process of interpretation and 
disallowing continuing possibilities, what Eco is really proposing, in Culler’s view, is under-
interpretation. Culler claims that interpretation is most interesting when it is “extreme” (167).  
Pushing interpretations past ones which are moderate, reserved, and safe, will create better 
attempts at finding characteristics which will have more impact. Arguing that the problem, “if 
anything [is] underinterpretation: a failure to interpret enough elements of the [work] and a 
failure to look at actual prior texts to find in them concealed [meanings],” Culler places emphasis 
in the contextual relations between works, moving the locus of meaning outside of a work (169).  
This externalization places emphasis on factors which were not present during the creation of the 
work, and therefore may add to a modification of meaning.  Culler reformulates the problem of 
overinterpretation using the term overstanding, conceived by Wayne Booth.  Overstanding 
“consists of pursuing questions that the text does not pose to its model reader,” as opposed to 
understanding which “is asking the questions and finding the answers that the text insists on” 




does, as Culler contends: 
If interpretation is reconstruction of the intention of the text, intentio operis, then these 
are questions that do not lead that way; they are about what the text does and how; how it 
relates to other texts and to other practices, what it conceals or represses, what it 
advances or is complicitous with. Many of the most interesting forms of modern criticism 
ask not what the work has in mind but what it forgets; not what it says but what it takes 
for granted. (173) 
 
Supporting Eagleton’s view that literature is inextricable from the power relations of a culture, 
Culler’s explanation of overstanding coincides well with the goals of literary theory. Literature 
provides a wealth of knowledge about “other practices,” involving the originating culture and 
ideology.  But theory is something larger and external to literature itself, and Culler’s view does 
not specifically refute Eco’s, but rather reveals a different goal as the end point in the course of 
understanding literature.  For Eco, the most significant aspect is the meaning and experience a 
reader receives from the work.  Culler’s emphasis on what a work omits, “forgets,” and “takes 
for granted” proposes that literature is either a passive transmitter of the larger cultural forces, 
which the author does not recognize, or that it advances such forces by actively omitting an 
articulation of them, which further assists in suppressing challenges to them.   Ultimately, in 
either case, the real substantial subjects of study become these forces.  This thinking supports 
what Alan Sinfield labels an “entrapment model,” which can disregard the active change 
produced by literature as dissident ideologies emerge.  If the most interesting aspect of literary 
work is not what inquiries “the texts insists upon,” but rather those not of immediate concern, 
then literature becomes generic source material for study, and the unique aesthetic character of 
each work is stripped away. 
The role of literary theory, Cullers argues, should not always be viewed as attempting 




particular content, criticism should not be viewed as “proposing new meanings,” but rather 
describing the systems of literature (Culler 176). Culler proposes that: 
Often what seems a biased critical interpretation giving excess weight to some factors 
and or structures and neglecting others should be seen, rather, as an attempt to understand 
the system of possibilities of literature, the general mechanisms of narrative, of 
figuration, of ideology, and so on. (176) 
 
Culler makes an interesting point regarding the form and content of the work.  Analyzing how a 
work is constructed, structured, functions, etc., can disassemble the work into its components 
without changing the meaning of the content which is aesthetically unique.  However, it seems 
important to differentiate the meta-literary study of a work’s structure and relation to culture, 
from the aesthetic experience derived from the particular details of the content within its form.  
The latter is important, not for determining how or why it works, but for what it actually does as 
it is encountered by a reader.  This marks an important difference between experience and study.  
When reading for sublime enlightenment, one does not need to keep literary analysis in the 
forefront of thinking, just as listening to a symphony does not require a working understanding 
of music theory and an awareness of the discrete elements involved.  Those systems and 
structures either become transparent as the work accomplishes its own design, or they become a 
distraction by standing out in front of the work while the content retreats into the background and 
experience is transformed into understanding.   As a form possessing concrete content, literature 
contains even more meaning that is unique and identifiable with the work than abstract artistic 
works built primarily upon structure and form, such as absolute music. The meaning that results 
from this content necessitates attention to interpretation rather than just attention to overall form. 
While Culler’s project of “understanding the various strategies of its forms” does illuminate the 




artistic one that centers on contemplation by the reader (178).   
Culler attempts to carefully maintain a position which upholds his preference for theory, 
while avoiding a pragmatist position in which literature enhances learning of everything external 
to literature itself. He concedes that pragmatism ignores “the question of how a text can 
challenge the conceptual framework with which one attempts to interpret it” (182). However, a 
view of literature which gives primacy to enjoyment and personal insight ultimately advances 
ideology, “by denying any public structure of argument in which the young or marginalized 
could challenge the views of their eminent elders, helps make their positions unassailable and in 
effect confirms a structure in place by denying that there is a structure” (179).  In order to avoid 
the entrapment model of ideological transmission, theory is necessary in addition to the primary 
mode of reading as artistic engagement in order to articulate the cultural structures at work.  The 
significance of theory, as influenced through Deconstruction, is in Culler’s terms the revelation 
of the “hierarchical oppositions [which] structure concepts of identity and the fabric of social and 
political life, and to believe that one has gone beyond them is to risk complacency abandoning 
the enterprise of critique, including the critique of ideology” (181). This position suggests that 
rejecting the use of a work as a model to examine the links in the chain of larger cultural forces 
will neglect ideological critique.  However, there can be effective examinations of a work’s 
relation to culture, as theory often does, without abandoning the idea that it is an artistic work, 
and as such retains a level of complexity beyond other discourses as it contains its own internal 
tensions and alternative possibilities. 
Despite his avoidance of pragmatism, Culler does agree with Richard Rorty in affirming 
that in the process of interpretation, “one thing we cannot do is set limits” (181).  Meaning is not 




of which cannot be identified in advance.” This response, however, ignores Eco’s “right of the 
text” which requires each interpretation to be evaluated in relation to the work as a whole. 
Without the work acting as arbitrator of internal meaning, external use becomes dominant and 
the determiner of meaning is removed from the author, the work, and even the reader, while 
being relegated to endless contexts instead. 
Culler’s ultimate reason for advocating extreme interpretation is a goal of “producing” 
something from the work, as he argues that:  
A method that compels people to puzzle over not just those elements that might seem to 
resist totalization of meaning but also those about which there might initially seem to be 
nothing to say has a better chance of producing discoveries . . . than a procedure that 
seeks only to answer those questions that a text asks its model reader.” (182).    
 
Since the limits of meaning cannot be fully defined during authorship, it does seem ultimately 
destructive to suggest that legitimate interpretations must be provoked by the work. Certainly 
Culler is right that part of the wealth contained within a literary work is its ability to produce 
discoverable meaning out of every detail, and he fears that the “play” of texts will diminish as a 
result of avoiding overinterpretation.  To suggest, however, that every detail is nearly endless in 
producing meaning transforms the original work into something beyond its own stable identity, 
just as arbitrary limits on meaning can diminish the readily available possibilities it possesses. 
What Culler doesn’t reference in this response is the category of aesthetic features.  The 
possibility of future discovery lies in the aesthetic harmonics which provide multiple layers of 
meaning. These emergences rely only on the work itself without the contextual references to 
external culture which are part of the study of theory. 
Culler agrees with Rorty’s pragmatic response to the idea of overinterpretation, claiming 




purposes and interpreting it as carefully as you can – both of these are just ways of putting the 
text to use . . . we should just use texts as we use word-processing programs, in an attempt to say 
something interesting” (177).  This analogy ignores what should be a primary fact about 
literature: that it has specific internal content.  A word processor, in contrast, has no content by 
design; it is a blank form intended to be used to the point that it no longer exists as a part of the 
final product.  The literary work already has something to say.  Proposing that it is just a starting 
point for readers to invent or realize their own “interesting” thoughts is a disservice to both the 
work and the author’s involvement in the complex and deliberate creation of the work, and 
places the totality of meaning into the reader’s response. It does not “respect” the work. 
Interpretation may be a kind of use, but using a text does not necessarily involve interpretation.  
The first acknowledges literature as a specific kind of discourse, while the latter removes this 
distinction and treats literature as just another cultural artifact, equivalent to anything else.  
Disregarding the distinction undermines the entire history and purpose of critical evaluation. 
Culler’s resistance to limiting interpretation, as potential underinterpretation, ultimately 
presents its own danger.  While new discourse and discussion can be generated from a process of 
ongoing interpretation, the discovery of which is based on the work under examination, the new 
interpretations can themselves become the basis of critical discourse.  If the work is no longer the 
central basis for such discourse, then the new “discoveries” become something that stands 
alongside the work as detached material, and can potentially overshadow the original. The 
danger of allowing overinterpretation to stand as valid commentary is that the process may 
continue along that particular direction and become understood as the primary or sole meaning of 
significance.  In such cases the new, and less connected, interpretations can obscure more 




as a possibility. Identifying, and possibly discontinuing, a branch of interpretation which can be 
demonstrated as a bad one, an overinterpretation, diminishes material which can alter future 
readings.  This reduces the risk of those “interpretations” having a negative impact on the other 
possibilities which are consistent with the whole work and have an equal claim to primacy, 
although they are created through the multi-valent “harmonics” of aesthetic language. As 
interpretations get further removed from the original work, they diminish the primacy of the 
work itself. Allowing complete inclusiveness in the critical examination of a work can eventually 
impose limitations by delegitimizing perspectives that contain more consistent and coherent 
interpretations.  Intentional overinterpretation allows for an increase in the quantity of 
discoveries which are relative to the work, but it may diminish the quality of discourse overall by 
diluting it.  While Culler regards this as under-interpretation, introducing elements which suggest 
a final “meaning” cut off the original possibilities and limit the ambiguous and harmonic 
qualities present.  If The Tempest becomes regarded simply as a play about the American 
colonization of the New World, then all of the other geopolitical events which inspired its final 
form, and of which the play has something to say, becomes forgotten.  Furthermore, the problem 
with interpretations that only use the work is that they become rewordings of it which replace the 
artistic construction itself and overshadow the original form.  As a particular interpretation it 
then achieves a primacy over the work and its aesthetic formulation of meaning.  This limits 
further reflection of the multivalent possibilities.  Interpretations of use can always bring in 
something new to the discussion of the work.  However, if they become removed from the work, 
and not directly supported by what the work articulates, then the discussion of the meaning 
becomes detached from the literary artifact and concerns something else and must be 




While both views present significant arguments, the process of interpretation, as a 
method of literary study, should differentiate between these two possibilities, and recognize its 
own limit while realizing that over-interpreting a work imposes limits on the aesthetic dimension 
of it, systematizing it and reducing it to a meaning that is defined from outside of the work.  
There should be a recognition of the ideological content which clearly resides within the work 
and is supported by the work itself as a whole.  This content necessarily influences the resulting 
interpretations.  The meaning of such interpretations, which involve links to the larger culture, 
can be demonstrated to be present, while leaving the question of authorial intent undetermined.  
Conversely, interpretations which only use the work to provide a useful analysis of the larger 
culture should be recognized as existing externally to the work, and as material not necessarily 
embedded and supported by the author or by the work.  They reside primarily in the receiving 
audience and in the web of connections that a work forms to culture and to other works, many of 
which originate some time after the completion of the literary work, and therefore cannot factor 
into the core meaning of it.  Those interpretations which consider only the work, or the work as 
the primary determiner, apply to fields which consider the aesthetic elements and regard 
literature as unique.  Those that consider all possibilities in relation to external factors are 
applicable to sociological and cultural studies, but are not necessarily literary. 
Following Eco’s argument, it seems that to study literature solely as an ideological 
document is to ignore the unique features which separate literature from other forms of 
discourse.  At some point the interpretive process must end, leaving the individual reader to 
contemplate and feel the aesthetic effects beyond conceptualization.  As an artistic form, 
literature contains aesthetic qualities as part of the harmonics produced.  Ignoring these aspects, 




Rather than simply transmitting ideology, aesthetic forms invite interpretation, and in doing so 
create a space of possibility in which new ideas can be introduced.  The literary use of language 
becomes a break, a gap, in the existing ideology.  As literature attempts to break new ground, to 
say something that hasn’t been said before, it expands the reader’s horizon.  By inviting 
interpretation, the literary work attempts to connect with a more fundamental world, unlike an 
artificial product sustained only through conventional use of language.  Through literature, the 





Chapter 3: The Ideological Possibilities of Literary Language 
In the process of considering acceptable interpretations, the nature of language in its literary 
form must be recognized.  The analysis provided in the works of both Alan Sinfield and Mikhail 
Bakhtin suggest a more complex structure to literature than many theoretical models of 
ideological transmission conclude.  Sinfield argues that within culture there are always present 
“faultlines” where the dominant ideological views are challenged and modified.  Bakhtin’s 
theories reveal a heterogeneous structure within the language that a literary work is constructed 
from, language which can present ideological tension within even a single sentence.  A literary 
narrative consists of various languages found within a particular culture which are coextensive 
and remain in an ongoing dialogical tension. These languages contain various ideological views, 
which further function as different types of ideology altogether. 
 Although Sinfield supports the view that political meaning is the mode of primary 
significance present within a literary work, in Faultlines: Cultural Materialism and the Politics 
of Dissident Reading he challenges the view supported by Eagleton, which he calls the 
entrapment model.  Derived from the work of Althusser and Foucault, this model suggests that:  
“ideological constructedness, not just of our ideas, but of our subjectivities, seems to control the 
scope for dissident thought and expression” (Sinfield 35).  In response, Sinfield asks: “if we 
come to consciousness within a language that is continuous with the power structures that sustain 
the social order, how can we conceive, let alone organize, resistance?” (35). Sinfield’s question 
is an important one.  Social change does occur as marginalized views become centralized. 
Literature’s place within this process appears not only as a possibility, but as a significant 
actuality.  As a distinct type of discourse, literature engages not just what is, but what could be 




reevaluate the static structure. Literature then becomes an agent of change, even as it reproduces 
the current ideological conditions in some ways. 
The answer suggested by Sinfield is that the ideological structure of society always 
contains tension from various power struggles which keep it from attaining a unified wholeness.   
Within any society there will be faultlines where these struggles come into conflict and compete 
for inclusion in the dominant ideology. Since ideology is never static and unified it must be 
continually produced, as Raymond Williams claims, and through that process contradictions 
emerge (41).  Sinfield claims that “the task for a political criticism, then, is to observe how 
stories negotiate the faultlines that distress the prevailing conditions of plausibility” (47).  
Literature is one device used in the advancement of these alternative ideologies and one way 
these conflicts become detectable and understood.  Sinfield argues that "dissident potential 
derives ultimately not from essential qualities in individuals . . . but from conflict and 
contradiction that the social order inevitably produces within itself, even as it attempts to sustain 
itself” (41).  Describing the interaction between culture and utterance, Sinfield claims: 
The inter-involvement of resistance and control is systematic: it derives from the way 
language and culture get articulated. Any utterance is bounded by the other utterances 
that the language makes possible. Its shape is the correlative of theirs: as with a 
duck/rabbit drawing, when you see the duck the rabbit lurks around its edges, constituting 
an alternative that may spring into visibility.  Any position supposes an intrinsic op-
position.  All stories comprise within themselves the ghost of alternate stories they are 
trying to exclude. (47) 
 
This visualization is instructive.  The imprint of a work on the surrounding context produces a 
“ghost,” opening space for alternate perspectives to be created. Like an illustration that appears 
as two things simultaneously, a literary work conveys meaning relating to multiple structures at 
the same time.  It works at two, or more, levels which may not be precisely compatible.  Just as 




grounded, the narrative limits of a literary work suggest what it is not. It produces a negative 
which then can be compared back to itself, continually producing meaning.  In response to new 
relations to its context, multiple interpretations can be established which are supported by the 
work as a whole.  To pick one as the definitive interpretation may completely ignore a possibility 
that might be just as legitimate.  Constraining the work within a pre-determined ideological 
mold, as entrapment theorists like Eagleton propose, dismisses other ideological perspectives.  
Such a method makes the work fit into pre-conceived notions and, as such, falls into use of the 
work without allowing it to exhibit its inherent perspectives on its own.  Literary works, as 
cultural products, become pawns in a larger contest of ideology, even as they may ultimately 
provide an escape from that very structure. 
Through the process of literary construction, the description of a culture embedded within 
a work brings out concealed details and allows a new viewpoint to emerge.  Sinfield argues that 
“even a text that aspires to contain a subordinate perspective must first bring it into visibility . . . 
and once that has happened there can be no guarantee that it will stay safely in its prescribed 
place.” (48).  Sinfield adds that “conversely, a text that aspires to dissidence cannot control 
meaning either” (48). Ultimately there can be no security in textuality.” Sinfield’s point is that 
when something new is created it emerges with possibilities.  Although a work will not 
necessarily be received as ideologically consistent with the dominant mode, it is possible that a 
work which intends to reject the dominant view may, in some eventual way, reinforce it.  The 
cultural landscape becomes disrupted, with the results unpredictable.   The underlying contests 
between ideologies cannot be stabilized even when placed within the frame of a literary work.  
Marginal views can be enhanced and amplified, providing a challenge to the established system.  




opposing views come into conflict.  Sinfield’s argument suggests a complexity to the nature of 
literature, there can never be a certainty that all interpretations of a work will be ideologically 
consistent with one side or another because there is an inherent ambiguity necessary in a poetic 
or literary structure.  Only after the work is put into play will it support a position.  
The ideological meaning of a literary text, in Sinfield’s view, is ultimately a result of how 
the work impacts the culture.  He concludes: 
formal textual analysis cannot determine whether a text is subversive or contained.  The 
historical conditions in which it is being deployed are decisive . . . meaning is not 
adequately deducible from the text-on-the-page. The text is always a site of cultural 
contest, but it is never a self-sufficient site. (49)  
 
This ideological position of a work is then not an inherently fixed property of a work’s meaning, 
it relies on external relations involved in use of the work.  These relations likely do not even 
exist during authorship but come about much later, through a work’s eventual reception.   
Sinfield’s point is that meaning is always fluid, changing as the historical periods of reception 
change.  While this undoubtedly pertains to ideology, which exists as an inter-subjective 
background larger than one particular author or work, the suggestion that a work has no 
independent meaning at all seems questionable.  There are clearly universal experiences which 
can be dramatized and understood throughout history, as they are more fundamental than the 
shifting ideological practices of local culture.  It is the world of the Symbolic and its particular 
understandings that changes as language and practice evolve, while the more fundamental 
existence of the Real escapes historical contingency.  Meaning which relates to the Real and 
provides a glimpse of the outside edge of the Symbolic seems likely to be a part of the internal 
structure of a work, connected to the design, purpose, and essence that defines the unique 




Sinfield’s discussion of Shakespeare notes that those plays are “powerful stories,” and as 
such “they contribute to the perpetual contest of stories that constitutes culture: its 
representations, and our critical accounts of them, reinforce or challenge prevailing notions of 
what the world is like, of how it might be . . . by appealing to the readers’ sense of how the world 
is, the text affirms the validity of the model it invokes” (50).  The nature of narrative stories in 
relation to our understanding of the world as described by Sinfield suggests that ideology can 
never be separated from art. However, as he claims, the potential for describing how it might be 
suggests the possibility of literature to provide a perspective beyond the current understanding, 
those ideological views which are necessarily contained within the Symbolic foundation of 
culuture.  By incorporating non-cognitive elements through aesthetic qualities, literature can 
bypass the current Symbolic structure and progress from one ideological base to another one.  
The literary work becomes a testing ground to model ideological views which can then be 
embraced or rejected by the reader.   
While literary quality is commonly associated with coherence as a whole, Sinfield rejects 
this idea, arguing that reliance on coherence is an illusion, and its absence allows for dissident 
possibilities: 
The quintessential traditional critical activity was always interpretation, getting the text to 
make sense . . . No story can contain all the possibilities it brings into play; coherence is 
always selection. And the range of feasible readings depends not only on the text but on 
the conceptual framework within which we address it. (50-51) 
 
Sinfield recognizes the “harmonics” that Eco discusses, and includes all of the possibilities as a 
part of the complete work.  Therefore, meaning can never be definitive, as new echoes arise 
which will need to be compared back to the work.  Placing meaning into the external world, 




it.  It is not pre-determined to passively transmit dominant modes of ideology, but introduces 
dissidence into the cultural contest of worldviews.  
  Like Sinfield’s exploration, Mikhail Bakhtin’s examination of language has revealed 
that there are complex forces and interactions below the surface of a literary work.  He argues 
that literary discourse is dialogic, containing a multitude of voices and competing 
languages.  This multiplicity of viewpoints, some pertaining to the author, some challenging the 
author or narrator, is a significant element of the aesthetic dimension of literature.  Unlike a 
monologic work where one voice attempts to present one unified message, as found in 
persuasive works of rhetoric or propaganda, there is a tension and conflict found within a 
narrative work that necessarily projects a multivalent meaning.   
In The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, Bakhtin discusses his concept of dialogism 
which defines language as a dialogue between multiple viewpoints, noting that it is stratified, 
fragmented, and constantly changing.  Not only do the different interlaced languages within a 
work reflect different ideological positions, there are opposing types of ideology to be 
understood.  Authoritarian discourse is an official, external ideology imposed on the subject.  In 
contrast, internally persuasive discourse is a view adopted and developed freely by the subject.  
A literary work exists as a dialogue between it and the external world which envelops the work. 
This dialogue allows the aesthetic work to break down the authoritarian discourse that exerts 
pressure from the outside and replace it with internally persuasive discourse, resulting in new 
and open possibilities for thought.   
Bakhtin’s analysis illuminates how language, particularly in the literary form of the 
novel, operates on multiple levels.  Language, he claims, “like the living concrete environment in 




languages, Bakhtin notes, “are specific points of view on the world, forms for conceptualizing 
the world in words, specific world views, each characterized by its own objects, meanings and 
values (291).  As symbolic structures, languages present the world in the form of conceptual 
organization, each producing a view constructed from a particular perspective which results in 
ideological distortion.  Rather than exist as an objective, detached, universal method of 
description, language is already a process within culture, coloring any description. 
Ideology, in Bakhtin’s assessment, is not a single, unified view that provides foundation 
for every aspect of understanding.  Rather, it is split into many various levels of thought which 
are embodied in language.  There are many ideological worlds in the process of interrelating: 
every day represents another socio-ideological semantic ‘state of affairs’, another 
vocabulary, another accentual system  . . . [language] represents the co-existence of 
socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between differing 
epochs of the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the present, between 
tendencies, schools, circles, and so forth, given a bodily form.” (Bakhtin  291) 
 
This has a significant impact on communication, and Bakhtin notes that “as a result of the work 
done by all these stratifying forces in language, there are no “neutral” words and forms –words 
and forms that belong to ‘no one’” (293).  Previously determined, and always filled with past 
usage and connotation, language is specifically chosen and put into new use by an author who 
further modifies it.  The writer “does not strip away the intentions of others . . . he does not 
violate these socio-ideological cultural horizons that open up . . . rather, he welcomes them into 
his work . . . and compels them to serve his own new intentions” (Bakhtin 299).  Literature, in 
this view, attempts to incorporate many realms of thought, adding the meanings of the original 
intentions to the author’s meaning of the new work, providing additional possibilities rather than 
reducing all views to specific ones.  As literature transmits ideological views, it is not just the 




focus.  Some become intensified, others diminished, but there is a continual process as various 
views become entangled. 
While Bakhtin distinguishes the different modes of ideological discourse into 
authoritative and internal, he claims that “an individual’s becoming, an ideological process, is 
characterized precisely by a sharp gap between these two categories” (342).  Transmission of an 
authoritative ideology does not necessarily cause one to adhere to it.  The subject must 
internalize an ideological view in order for it to become a viable option. Readers, then, are not 
passively receptive, but rather take an active role in ideological immersion. 
Perhaps the most significant aspect in understanding Bakhtin’s critique of ideology is his 
examination of how these different discourses work as they are presented in aesthetic form.  
Describing the presence of authoritative discourse, Bakhtin notes that it: “permits no play with 
the context framing it, no play with its borders, no gradual and flexible transitions, no 
spontaneously creative stylized variants on it.  It enters our consciousness as a compact and 
indivisible mass, one must either totally affirm it, or totally reject it” (343). Furthermore, it 
“cannot be represented – it is only transmitted” (Bakhtin 344). As an indivisible mass, it cannot 
be “double-voiced” or integrated with other discourse as a “hybrid construction,” which leaves 
the artistic representation of it “impossible” (344). As ideology devoid of “play,” there is no 
chance for meaning to evolve, to be reconfigured in new contexts, or provide new insight. If the 
ideological view that it presents is not accepted by the reader, then it becomes just an object, an 
empty thing, and “falls out of the artistic context” (344). If it is accepted, then it remains viable, 
but as a distinct discourse detached from the rest of the meaning.  Therefore, while literature may 
reproduce the dominant ideology, the authoritative mode is held in its own layer of the work and 




artistic meanings transcend this layer of context allowing this authoritative ideology to be 
examined separately from the meaning of the work as an artistic one.  The ideological context 
may explain parts of the creative evolution of the work, but does not determine the overall 
meaning.  
Although the two kinds of discourse can unite in rare instances so that the authoritative is 
persuasive and the persuasive gains authority, Bakhtin argues that it is usually the case that the 
authoritative is distanced and unengaging, while the internally persuasive “is denied privilege, 
backed up by no authority at all, and is frequently not even acknowledged in society” (342).  In 
this acknowledgement, Bakhtin reveals a significant aspect of literature; those meanings which 
become persuasive to the reader, but yet fall outside of the social construct, detached from the 
ideological system. This suggests something outside the Symbolic order, but which is capable of 
being apprehended by the subjective individual.  This struggle between conflicting discourses 
and voices “determine[s] the history of an individual ideological consciousness” (342). The 
individual’s ideological views are not completely coextensive with all other members of society.  
Each individual develops views which are internally persuasive, creating a unique variation of 
the culturally dominant one, which becomes expanded or modified over time. 
As art is an event that challenges the values of the audience, internally persuasive 
discourse brings about open possibilities in contrast to the authoritative, as Bakhtin notes: 
It is not so much interpreted by us as it is further, that is, freely, developed, applied to 
new material, new conditions . . . it enters into an intense interaction, a struggle with 
other internally persuasive discourses . . . the semantic structure of an internally 
persuasive discourse is not finite, it is open; in each of the new contexts that dialogize it, 
this discourse is able to reveal ever newer ways to mean (345).  
 
As an author’s vision becomes shared with the reader, meaning becomes dislodged from one 




ways to mean,” Bakhtin’s exploration supports some rights of the work.  When internal discourse 
constitutes an artistic work, superseding externally imposed authority, the work will remain 
creative and productive (345). As the contexts and views of the reader change, and the intentions 
of the author become more distant, the one stable point will be the work, a fixed set of 
utterances.  There is some uniquely identifiable object that is the originator of meaning in all of 
these new conditions, a common element of each new interpretation.  As a central point, around 
which all new meanings revolve, the work is left as the determining factor in interpretation, still 
possessing some of the shared meaning.  In stressing aesthetic essence, Bakhtin claims that form 
and content are one and must be understood in relation as a whole. Arguing that “these 
heterogeneous stylistic unities, upon entering the novel combine to form a structured artistic 
system, and are subordinated to the higher stylistic unity of the work as a whole, a unity that 
cannot be identified with any single one of the unities subordinated to it,” Bakhtin notes that the 
constituent elements of language that make up the work lose individual meaning which is 
superseded by the meaning generated by the entire work (262). 
Making a distinction between narrative language of the novel and poetic language, 
Bakhtin argues that poetic language is a unified voice of the poet, in contrast to the hetergenous 
make-up of the novel.  While there is an apparent absence of the tensions found in a the multi-
voice form of the novel, this view does seem to disregard the possible disparity between the poet 
and the speaker of the poem, as well as the inclusion of language from various discrete aspects of 
social life which enhance the meaning of each line and adds dimension as it expands the poetic 
possibilities in multiple directions.  As the language in poetry is foregrounded, the disjunction 




numerous characters to elucidate distinct viewpoints, as found in a narrative work. Taking into 
account these aspects of poetic language, poetry seems to be as potentially dialogic as the novel. 
Rather than an abstract and detached system, Bakhtin recognizes language as already 
immersed in cultural thought, and recognizes language as “ideologically saturated . . . as a world 
view, even as a concrete opinion, insuring a maximum of mutual understandings in all spheres of 
ideological life” (271). Aware that language operates within the historical and social contexts 
that envelop the world of a particular culture, Bakhtin claims that:  
The living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular historical moment in 
a socially specific environment, cannot fail to brush up against the thousands of living 
dialogic threads, woven by socio-ideological consciousness around the given object of an 
utterance; it cannot fail to become an active participant in social dialogue. (276) 
 
While language is non-neutral, and entering into discourse brings into play all of the past 
meanings and connotations, artistic works can make use of this preconditioned understanding.  
Deliberately interacting with language and the reader, Bakhtin understands literature to be an 
active event, and notes that the writer “elevates the social heteroglossia surrounding objects into 
an image that has finished contours, an image completely shot through with dialogized 
overtones; he creates artistically calculated nuances on all the fundamental voices and tones of 
this heterglossia” (278). The author uses the tension between views to bring new meaning out of 
discourse, knowing that there is an internal incompatibility, or possible contradiction that will 
never be resolved.  Making use of these persistent and unresolved “overtones” to create 
“nuances” that enhance meaning leaves open room for interpretation and continual reevaluation 
in relation to the ideological contexts surrounding the work.    
In contrast, “all rhetorical forms,” Bakhtin argues, are “monologic in their compositional 




view without creating an open dialogue.  Novelistic discourse maximizes the dialogic properties 
of language, and the coexistence of multiple perspectives. The dialogic nature invites a response 
from the reader, but the response is one that must relate to the ambiguous nature of the ongoing 
discourse.  Consequently, literature produces its own antithesis to previously determined 
interpretations; it resists synthesis into one interpretive conclusion.  Bakhtin’s categorization 
reveals not only the complexity of language, but the continual struggle occurring between 
meanings which make a complete static understanding impossible to definitively determine.  
Meaning can constantly shift as the work falls into new contextual relations.  Therefore, a work 
has the potential to introduce new ideological thought as it is encountered by new readers.  To 
suggest a work is precisely a product of the ideological determined base of a particular culture, 
or to say that only one interpretation is an accurate one, is to ignore the possibilities that reside 
within it.  Fixing the work to a particular viewpoint is to put it to use, but does not capture the 
meaning, or meanings, which are inherently possible. 
In Mikhail Bakhtin, Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist further articulate Bakhtin’s 
aesthetic theory, noting that he “seeks the aesthetic where it was traditionally avoided, in the 
totality of the author/text/reader relationship” (208). His view suggests that: 
Any theory in art must take into account three elements: creators, artworks, and 
perceivers.  Formalists over-privilege the second category, while idealists invest too 
much in the first and third categories. Both extremes get the subject wrong. ‘They attempt 
to discover the whole in the part. . . Meanwhile, the ‘artistic’ in its total integrity is not 
located in the artifact and it is not located in the separately considered psyches of creator 
and contemplator; it encompasses all three of these factors.’ (202) 
 
This assessment helps illuminate the challenges of interpretation, first by recognizing the 
importance of the residing aesthetic qualities and the integrity of a work as an artistic object, and 




addition to the continuing reception of the readers.  Interpretation cannot be left to be fully 
determined by only one component; realizing the importance of each aspect of this triad imposes 
some limits on the other two. Like Eco’s intention of the work, there always remains the initial 
creative product which contains the unchangeable language of the work. The persistence of it 
through varying contexts can override reception which takes interpretation of meaning too far. 
Bakhtin attempts what Clark and Holquist call a “cosmological shift,” moving “the center of the 
textual world” from the author to the work, placing literary works within the “give and take of 
narrative energy” exerted by its constituent voices. (245). As a result of this shift, the work adds 
its own voice to that of the author, rejecting any initial, privileged monologic viewpoint. 
As Clark and Holquist’s discussion of Bakhtin emphasizes, his view revolves around the 
idea that literary works are “never finally completed,” as “an utterance can never be ‘finished’: a 
residue of meaning must be left over even after the most exhaustive analysis of [it]” (188).  
While the formalists claimed that the work was a coherent whole, “the sum of its devices,” for 
Bakhtin the work is more than that (188).   The aesthetic object “is not completely coincidental 
with the external, material form but is nevertheless inseparable from it . . . [and] is never fully 
grasped but is rather an act of understanding that is not yet completely understood.  Any attempt 
to limit art to its brute form treats art as if it were over, as if it were a thing and not a deed” 
(Clark and Holquist 189).  The meaning of the work exceeds the understanding of any one point 
of observation, transcending both the available conceptual framework of a historic point, and the 
perception of any one reader, as each one will have different receptions. Recognizing art as a 
distinct category requires understanding that meaning can never be fully apprehended. 
This remainder of meaning that is not yet understood and is not fully contained in the 




The wider meaning falls outside of the known understandings of language in the denotative 
sense, which exist within the limitations of the Symbolic, leaving a remainder of meaning to 
persist only in the Real.  The work of art, through its aesthetic nature, bridges the limit of these 
two orders.  While it cannot bring defined meaning to the Real, the aesthetic points toward that 
space, and allows meaning to be expanded through future considerations, as the limits of the 
Symbolic are pushed further out.  This is a never ending process, however, as new 
understandings and interpretations arise the Symbolic limits will be expanded again, allowing 
new interpretations. 
Dialogism, as Clark and Holquist describe it, “is Bakhtin’s attempt to think his way out 
of such all-pervasive monologism” (348).  Denoting a “single truth,” monologism “is the 
conceptual glue which holds together the complex mosaic of religious, political, psychological, 
and aesthetic attitudes that were typical of most cultures in the past” (348).  Put into an aesthetic 
form, literature is disconnected from these other types of discourse, and there is an inverse 
relationship between the specific meaning located within a social context, and its artistic 
universality.  As Clark and Holquist state it: 
the freer from specific alterities or the less subordinate to local conditions of expression a 
text becomes, the more aesthetic it becomes.  Aesthetics, in other words, constitutes a 
version of liberty. . . . Insofar as the aesthetic is indeed a sphere in which local factors are 
least determining, it is always the world of greatest otherness, the biggest loophole 
through which the present may escape to a future undreamed of in worlds of less 
expansive discourse, such as politics or religion, where the future is a knowable outcome 
of the present. (210-11) 
 
Incorporating “otherness,” literary language does not focus narrowly like monologic discourse, 
but rather widens and diffuses, so that a larger view can possibly emerge. It is not limited 
directly to the particulars of an immediate situation. Rather than attempting to causally have a 




perception for a less immediate, but more profound impact on agents within the world.   Literary 
language includes a dimension of value, which necessitates a consideration of quality that cannot 
be reduced to quantitative terms.  
  Though the harmonic qualities of literature, which allows it to always say more than it 
apparently utters, there is an introduction of ideas from the outside of a particular, local historical 
situation. Bakhtin: 
assigns the term “novel” to whatever form of expression within a given literary system 
reveals the limit of that system as inadequate, imposed, or arbitrary. . . . It does not permit 
generic monologue. It insists on a dialogue between texts that a given system admits as 
literature and those texts which are excluded from such a definition.  The novel is a kind 
of epistemological outlaw, a Robin Hood of texts. Because the fundamental features of 
any culture are inscribed in its texts, not only in its literary texts but in its legal and 
religious ones as well, “novelness” can work to undermine the official or high culture of 
any society. (Clark and Holquist 276-277) 
 
Bakhtin then rejects the Marxist view that literature was “just part of the ideological 
superstructure reflecting the economic base” (Clark and Holquist 190).  As an active process, 
revealing the limits of a social system, art injects something new and can then challenge the 
existing ideologies, which persist only in the artificial constructs of pre-existing discourse. 
Attempting to describe how the literary work exists as an aesthetic artifact, as well as a socio-
economic product, Bakhtin argues that the aesthetic and social qualities are not separate, but are 
entangled within the work.  However, the aesthetic essence cannot be defined by the social and 
economic conditions, just as physical properties of an object cannot be determined from its 
economic value.  Bakhtin notes that the aesthetic properties of the work clearly belong to “the 
‘conceptual’ realm of the mind” (Clark and Holquist 200). As a layer of qualities distinctly 
removed from the physical properties that the work maintains in the material world, aesthetic 




mental responses. Irreducible to just the external elements, the artistic quality of the work is then 
more than the sum of its parts, and it resides purely in the realm of human activity. This 
immediate connection between artwork and mind functions as a way of interpreting the world, 
and subsists as a parallel to language, but without the limitations of defined language as it 
organizes conceptual understanding. 
Suggesting a level of literary autonomy, Bakhtin notes that aesthetic works are not, 
unlike other kinds of discourse, “locally dependent on one context.  Aesthetics is a special 
instance of communicating in which the text makes a minimal appeal to its environment for help 
in constructing its meaning” (Clark and Holquist 209). Thus, the construction of meaning arises 
primarily from the internal structure of the work, rather than external factors. Aesthetic meaning, 
as suggested by this view, is similar to existential meaning of the self.  Both are always open to 
reinterpretation and never finally defined.  For Bakhtin, “a self, or a text, can never achieve 
complete autonomy, but the less determined each is by its local environment, the freer each is to 
live and have meaning in other contexts” (Clark and Holquist 210).  Construction of the self 
takes place within the struggle between the internally persuasive and the authoritative.  Clark and 
Holquist note that the significance of Bakhtin’s favorite work The Decameron is the idea that 
“there is always a loophole” (347). This conclusion recognizes that: 
there are no ultimate explanations that everyone, without exception, will accept as 
exhausting all possibilities . . . heterogeneity and contradiction . . . dominate human life 
and the consequent speciousness of all claims to the absolute . . . Dialogism is founded 
on the ineluctability of our ignorance, the necessary presence of gaps in all our fondest 
schemes and most elaborate systems. (Clark and Holquist 347) 
 
In rejecting absolutes, Bakhtin recognizes that human life is full of contradiction, and therefore 
literature, as a reflection of life and human ambiguity, will then contain its own contradictions as 




where sustaining a systematic completeness is unworkable.  Even the most “elaborate systems” 
cannot completely explain reality.  While revealing the incompleteness of the social world, art 
also reveals the possibility of human freedom.  This understanding of art emphasizes the gap 
between the Symbolic and the Real orders. While the structures of the Symbolic attempt to 
totalize knowledge into a complete system, there is always something remaining that does not fit 
and eventually emerges as a contradiction.  Alternatively, at the level of the Real, knowledge 
may be incomplete and understanding non-conceptual, but there is a persistent freedom that 
aligns with human existence as a lived activity in the immediate world. Literature is a 






Chapter 4: Aesthetics and the Real 
 A work which stands out as being predominately interpreted in relation to ideological 
modes is George Orwell’s novel 1984.  This novel is quite often presented as an allegory of the 
dangers of left-wing politics in defense of right-wing political ideology.  Historically and 
biographically the conventional ideological reading has been revealed to be inaccurate in respect 
to Orwell’s personal view as a Socialist and his ability to separate Stalinist totalitarianism from 
Socialism.  That specific interpretation, then, is not plausibly synonymous with the original 
intention of the work. Even if this extraneous evidence is discarded through consideration of 
legitimate primary material, the aesthetic construction of the novel through its subjective 
narrative undermines its own potential conclusion as a specific ideological position.  Due to the 
explicit foregrounding of ideological conditions, this work does add significant contributions to 
political discourse. While similar dystopian works become parables to illustrate the author’s 
personal ideological argument, and hence to persuade the reader to adopt a particular viewpoint, 
Orwell’s narrative leaves an inconclusive ending which provides space for the reader to mentally 
respond.   Through conscious reference to an ideological framework, 1984 calls out ideology 
itself for critique, and suggests that viewpoints are not immutable and the reader’s perspective 
about ideology can remain fluid. Orwell reveals that language and ideology are inseparable, and 
rather than having an effect on any particular ideology, the restructuring of language effects all 
political thought. 
The “meaning” of 1984 is not Orwell’s rejection of ideology altogether, as a method of 
left-wing politics which taken to an extreme degree would become an authoritarian Big Brother.  
This interpretation is often presented as an apparent non-ideological position which rejects 




Orwellian society as an “other” in contrast to the “self,” its own anti-left position. The fictional 
world, it is presumed, exists beyond a “false consciousness” which forms the limit, distorting and 
separating it from the “truth,” providing a mirror that defines the “true” undistorted world of the 
interpreter. Rather, Orwell’s attempt at meaning, on the surface level, suggests an evaluation of 
all ideology. Several points in the story explicitly state that the Party is not associated with 
Communism, as when O’Brien suggests a contrast to the Communist belief that “around the 
corner lay a paradise where human beings are free and equal” in his response that “we are not 
like that” (Orwell 217).  The work is therefore not an allegory of twentieth-century movements, 
but an exploration of a deeper underlying structure.  There is an awareness of the ideological 
process explicit in the work, as it describes a society that is hyper-ideological.  The sanctioned 
ideology of the Party is foregrounded in every aspect of life as a monolithic singularity that 
totalizes all elements of life and culture, eliminating any dissident thought, rather than subsisting 
as a transparent influence.  
1984 clearly presents the nature of ideology as existing inextricably within the order of 
language.  The evolution of language into Newspeak is an attempt by the official ideology of 
Insoc to narrow meaning and eliminate any ambiguity or connotation. Language is reduced to a 
mathematical specificity, and all ambiguity and multivalent possibility is removed. The reduction 
of meaning into a single possibility will then eradicate any dissident views that challenge a pure 
ideology. Determining precisely how individuals would think, “the purpose of Newspeak was 
not only to provide a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the 
devotees of Insoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossible” (Orwell 246).  Through 
continual reduction of available language, the Party could “diminish the range of thought” to the 




(Orwell 300).  Not only is there an elimination of the possibility of political thought, how things 
could or should be, but the very understanding of reality is compressed, as the Party claims that 
“in the end we shall make thought crime impossible, because there will be no words in which to 
express it” (41).  Everything contained in language, all information, historic records and written 
discourse is controlled to the point that Winston realizes “most of the material . . . had no 
connection with anything in the real world” (Orwell 37). Ideology is shown to be purely artificial 
construct, deliberately produced and manipulated through psychological processes; it does not 
reside as a natural foundation. Since ideology resides within a conceptual framework, reducing 
the available concepts leaves just one singular view, it is a thesis with no antithesis. In this world 
of constricted language, art, particularly the literary arts, becomes an impossibility. 
In “Language and Ideology in George Orwell’s 1984,” Steven Blakemore emphasizes the 
connection between language and ideology in the novel.  The world is understood through 
language, and as meaning is strictly narrowed and defined that understanding can be shaped and 
controlled.  Blakemore remarks that “control of language masks a profound hatred of language, 
as long as language can express a rebellious reality the Party will never be completely satisfied” 
(354).  Although intent on actualizing the process of destroying old languages and replacing 
them with a tightly regulated one, the Party realizes “even newspeak is potentially subversive to 
its ideology. Consequently, the Party’s goal is to destroy language itself” (Blakemore 355). As 
such, the existence of any language system at all can allow dissent and undermine the dominant 
ideological thought. Furthermore, “as the Party violently breaks the delicate nexus between 
language and reality, it attempts to "break" the very nature of language as we know it” 
(Blakemore 354). Even language as communication, the very basic characteristic of human 




process, as it can never be narrowed enough.  “In fact,” Blakemore claims, “the Party's ideology 
ensures that there can never be a definitive edition” of Newspeak (354).  Within the narrative, 
Blakemore notes, books become a symbol for resistance, a location where language breaks free 
from the sociopolitical restraints.  There are secret books, such as Winston’s diary and 
Goldstein’s forbidden book, where thought can be freely explored, and the world outside of 
Oceania can be evaluated.  
The forbidden aspects of these literary constructs suggest a quality embedded within 
literature that escapes the thought horizon imposed by the inter-subjective social world. The 
more totalizing the ideological world becomes, the more it creates a question of what it is not. 
The attempt by the Party is to create a world which exists solely in the Symbolic order, carefully 
and deliberately constructed through language to construct meanings that precisely fit the Party 
worldview.  O’Brien claims that “external reality is not important . . . reality is inside the skull” 
(Orwell 218).  This process, however, does not account for the Real.  Experience as it is fully 
encountered before linguistic concepts cannot be fully explained, or concealed, in this narrow 
language, and the excess meaning which does not fit into official definition hints at the Real, the 
experience beyond language, and the possibility that things could be different.  While many 
regard 1984 as a description of the radical realization of actually existing ideologies, the work is 
an exploration of the inversion of the signifier and signified, where what is real is what is stated 
in language, despite what occurs in the raw physical existence.  The outcome of this system of 
ideology is the complete negation of the Real.  The constant need to redefine language suggests 
the inherent possibilities of dissent that cannot be ordered by dominant thought and must 
continually be battled to retain control.  Beyond an apparent argument of ideology, Orwell’s 




The geopolitical structure of 1984, as shifting alliances of the “other” in relation to the 
national self, reveals several aspects of ideology at work.  Not only is the endless war necessary 
to help subjugate the populace in a totalitarian manner, but the “other” is necessary to even 
define what is to be a member of “our” culture.  Oceania needs the rivals of Eurasia and Eastasia 
to define the limits of its own “true” ideology.  Even though the consistent ideologies of all three 
super-states, persisting as Neo-Bolshevism in Eurasia and as the Death worship of East Asia, are 
“very much the same,” they are perpetuated as “others,” providing a contrast to “truth” (Orwell 
162).   Whatever constitutes the national identities of Eurasia and Eastasia, they are false 
understandings, and can be displayed as a commonly understood example of “not us”.  Ideology 
exists as a continual conflict, because at a more fundamental level the world exists in a state of 
social antagonism, as claimed by Zizek.  Ideology can never exist as a stable, unified theory 
shared by all members of a culture.  There will be points where the unresolvable antagonisms 
bleed through.  In the case of 1984, the presence of alternate ideologies presumed to be “false” 
provides the most stability for Oceania to give authenticity to their own.  Goldstein’s endless 
rebellion also serves this purpose.  It is deliberately allowed to propagate in appearance, despite 
possibly being only a fiction, in order to cover over any possible disruptions which would show 
the artificiality of the Party’s ideology. 
Had the Party succeeded in destroying language, and with it any possible dissent, there 
could be realization of a point where no conflict ever occurs.  This success of Newspeak would 
control all of reality, by completely controlling all perception of it; there would be no edge of 
thought where language breaks down, no faults where thoughts are contested.  There would just 
be infinite sameness.  In this perfectly stable and harmonious civilization, there would no longer 




possibilities as well.  Without the possible idea that things could be different, somehow other 
than they are, no artistic endeavors could be inspired or considered. The result would be a 
perfectly ordered machine, artificial and inhuman, controlling desire and the irrational tendencies 
of the human. At the end of history there would be no meaning.  O’Brien admits this as he 
explains total exertion of power will create a world where “there will be no art, no literature and 
no science” (Orwell 220). However, without an anti-thesis, this non-ideological state there would 
have nothing to ground meaning in the master signifier, risking the cohesiveness of the State. 
Because reality, although totalized, would still exist as a construct, not as an objective God’s-eye 
viewpoint of all physical reality, the potential for any excess of the Real to be introduced as a 
disruption could cause non-stability within the established world. Thus, the annihilation of 
language would ultimately be an impracticality, both in everyday existence and as an apparatus 
of the State. An apparently totalized, non-ideological, State would be as undesirable as a hyper-
ideological one, as it would be both inhuman and absurd. 
Orwell could have framed the particular ideas of this story in one of his academic works 
on language and discussed them in relation to reality.  But, by setting them in a fictional future, 
an aesthetic experience results. Presenting the ideas in an article would have shaped an argument 
leading to a precise conclusion.  Alternatively, developing the ideas into a fictional form allows 
for a discussion in which each reader will find his or her own unique viewpoint to add.  1984 
provides a commentary on ideology in practice that can be used to critique real world ones, and 
provides an example of a society that manipulates language for an ideological purpose which can 
be used as a comparison to ones like the Communist governments of the twentieth century, but it 
can also be used to evaluate those which are anti-Big Brother.  However, as a fictional 




the protagonist within the haunting images of an alien, but logically consistent, world.   Through 
shared experience with the character the reader comes to personally understand how this world 
can actually function and the abstract theory is put into a test model. As an artistic experience, 
the reader is confronted with questions regarding the individuals’ relation to truth, allegiance, 
and responsibility. At the center of the work resides the question of sanity as Smith attempts to 
discern truth.  Often confronted by his own dreams of his mother and of the past, Smith 
experiences images and feelings that cannot be completely understood in his everyday reality; 
something from outside his world begins to surface.  It is at the point when Smith reaches a new 
level of awareness through contemplation of the sky, comprehending that it will be up to the 
proles to realize that things can be different, that his free thought is terminated and he is pulled 
back into the Symbolic world dominated by ideology.  This is perhaps the most aesthetic point of 
the novel, when freedom and hope enter the narrative as possibilities through sublime 
apprehension that the world is larger than Insoc’s characterization of it. The immediate reversal, 
when all hope is lost, sets up the dramatic tension that reveals what is lost, what exists beyond 
the wall of language. Forced to choose between two worlds, Smith had betrayed the Symbolic 
world of the Party to embrace his personal desire of the Real through the illicit relationship with 
Julia.  Execution by the Party means not only physical death in the Real, but one’s entire 
personal existence is nullified as all records are erased from history. The Party exemplifies 
Zizek’s proposal that “you only die twice,” once in the Symbolic and once in the Real 
(“Sublime” 145).  After facing punishment and reeducation, the Party is able to destroy Smith’s 
human desires of the Real, and force him to exist entirely within their reality of the Symbolic, 
thus unnaturally constraining his human dimension and crippling his sanity. Thus he exists in an 




The objective of the world of Insoc is the opposite of what is accomplished by literature. 
Newspeak, in its ongoing process of removing words from language use, attempts to deny the 
possibility that language can describe an alternate reality, supporting the naturalized worldview 
constructed from Newspeak. In contrast, the multiplicity of meaning at work in literature 
provides alternate views, many of which can result in subversive visions, potentially rivaling the 
dominant thought.  Rather than “the meaning,” meanings, as a multiplicity beyond the surface, 
can arise from all of the events, descriptions, and word choices present.  Orwell, in opposition to 
the Party of his work, shows that wider and less controlled connotations provide an escape from 
the ideological constraints of language. As an example to be used as an illustrative model, it is 
effective.  However, simply categorizing 1984 as an example of the ideological nature of left 
wing governments is an instance of overinterpretation, as it leaves that idea as the final definition 
without acknowledging the deeper aspects of the work that allow it to additionally address other 
themes.  The novel concerns itself with psychology as much as politics, and other layers of 
interpretation regarding religious themes persist as well. The common ideological interpretation 
that often results falls into political discourse, and is not concerned with its literary nature, which 
would explore all of the possibilities that the work internally provides.   
Literary works such as 1984, can reveal something about ideology even as they originate 
from within it.  The unavoidable influence of ideology has been positively revealed by literary 
theory.  Woven into the fabric of cultural understanding, it is what explains the world and 
provides a “sense" of how things are, however disconnected that view might actually be from 
objective existence.  Therefore, it makes all understanding political.   Despite the similarities 
between art and ideology in attempting to connect the object and the subject, Zizek’s Lacanian 




ways.  Zizek’s approach is to examine the gaps and contradictions present in cultural artifacts, 
which can be used to illuminate the ideological functions of these artifacts.  This provides a 
realization that ideology covers inconsistencies in existence by attempting to provide a smooth, 
unified, and totalizing, systematic method for categorizing reality.  Because these inconsistencies 
are detectable, this unification can never be complete.  Art, by its design as a complex and 
ambiguous structure, can not only identify these inconsistencies, but can intentionally create and 
intensify them.  Where Zizek uses cultural artifacts to expose the certain presence of ideology, 
the experience of these artworks can be used to find the limits of the ideology. As Zizek states: 
The Real is the rock upon which every attempt at symbolization stumbles, the hard core 
which remains the same in all possible worlds (symbolic universes); but at the same time 
its status is thoroughly precarious; it is something that persists only as failed, missed, in a 
shadow, and dissolves itself as soon as we try to grasp it in its positive nature. (“Sublime” 
190) 
 
Zizek's definition provokes a connection between the Real and the aesthetic.  The Real is the 
most basic encounter with existence and drives humanity to produce new ways of elucidating 
that encounter through the art work.  As a sublime presence, like the quilting points of ideology, 
aspects of the Real are too large to be fully grasped.  The aesthetic realm allows for exploration 
of the gap between the cognitively articulated and the experiential limits of existence itself. The 
experience of the Real is continually retold through history in a variety of ways, from different 
cultural perspectives through different forms such as drama, novel and poetry, but the “hard 
core” of definitive experience is never fully articulated.  While literature attempts to grasp and 
describe the fundamental experiences that are universal human ones, it never fully reaches a 
complete parity, as experience transcends mere linguistic description.  The literary works points 
toward that experience, but it is one which is always out of the complete grasp of the work, “in a 




describe the world with accuracy, through aesthetic means it provides a simulated experience.  
The resulting aesthetic effect produced by language stands behind and apart from the narrative as 
a parallel.  It is larger than interpreted meaning and transcends reductive articulation.   
Entrapment theories, like Eagleton’s, fail to account for the aesthetic effects that emerge 
beyond language.  These emotive and visceral parallels to the cognitive content provide and 
amplify meaning which cannot be conceptualized.  While Eagleton supports theory as a way of 
breaking the common misconception of dominant views existing as necessary and natural facts, 
aesthetics has a similar goal. It provides a counter balance to the ideological content and exposes 
the artificiality of presumed thought.  The point of committing attention to aesthetics, is not 
useless, as Eagleton suggests, but rather provides something beyond use, revealing additional 
meaning.  Foregrounding the cultural context over the specifics of the work reveals further 
understanding of the cultural practices that reside in the Symbolic, while allowing the unique 
aesthetic aspects of the particular work to remain in sharp focus reveals connections to the Real 
which extends beyond particular cultures.  Theory should not assume that aesthetics reinforces a 
false sense of reality, rather it should include discussion of the aesthetic as another form of 
breaking through the horizon of thought and realizing that things could be different. As a space 
where the Real and the Symbolic struggle, literature is a battleground of ideas, presenting them 
for consideration and evaluation, and in turn creating new ones.  Rather than transmitting just the 
dominant views of a culture, literary works transmit the cultural dialogue which is never fully 
resolved, but continues on in a state of flux.  The dominant views may be present on the surface, 
but within the work there is a suggestion of dissent and the emergence of an antithesis which can 




Non-literary works, those of a monologic nature, are much better suited for the 
sociological analysis of culture because those works are not built on an ambiguous foundation, 
but rather attempt to transmit a precise message that represents something in the cultural 
ideology.  The significance of literature, as well as other artistic creations, is that they can open a 
space to communicate a knowledge which escapes transmission through conceptual systems.  As 
ideology reveals its own limitations, there are vague notions which are not fully articulated or 
completely systemized within experience.  Art can originate these notions and, while exploring 
them, illustrate alternatives to the existing orders of experience. Although literature is 
constructed out of the arbitrary and contingent elements of language, it foregrounds language and 
highlights this detachment from the signified world, allowing it to possess a complexity of 
meaning.  The aesthetic work places experience back into an ambiguous state, one which reverts 
to the pre-Symbolic, before it has been artificially oversimplified through social and conceptual 
processes, and reverses the compartmentalization and reduction into discrete terms. As art 
accesses the space where the Symbolic meets the Real, the ultimate value of literature is that it 
can rearrange the ideological fields, providing more perspective without pressing a particular 
work into a fixed ideological form. Rather the remaining ideologically neutral, it is a space 
where multiple ideologies can persist, conflict, intertwine, coextend, and be reflected in 
comparison. While both aesthetics and ideology exist at the edge of human understanding, at the 
limit of thought, ideology fixes that boundary while aesthetics expands it as it attempts deeper 
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